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Proposal to Reform the Like Kind and
Involuntary Conversion Rules in Light of
Fundamental Tax Policies: A Simpler, More
Rational and More Unified Approach
FredB. Brown*
I. INTRODUCTION
Almost from the beginning of the federal income tax, the law has contained
two nonrecognition provisions' that have undergone relatively little change: the
like kind rule and the involuntary conversion rule.2 The like kind rule provides

* Associate Professor ofLaw and Director ofthe Graduate Tax Program, University
of Baltimore School of Law; B.S. with high honors 1982, Rutgers University; J.D.
summa cum laude 1985, Georgetown University; LL.M., New York University 1986.
I would like to thank Chuck Borek, Wendy Gerzog, Jack Lynch, Deborah Schenk, and
Walter Schwidetzky for reviewing and providing very helpful comments on earlier drafts
of this Article. I would also like to thank Peggie Albiker and Gloria Joy for their
outstanding production assistance. Any remaining errors are solely the responsibility of
the author.
1. On the sale or other disposition of property, a taxpayer will realize gain or loss
in an amount equal to the difference between the amount realized on the transaction and
the taxpayer's adjusted basis in the disposed of property. I.R.C. § 1001(a) (2001). The
gain or loss realized upon a disposition will not, however, be includable in gross income
or deductible from income, respectively, to the extent that a nonrecognition provision
applies to the disposition. See id. § 1001(c). All section references are to the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986 as amended orthe Treasury Regulations promulgated thereunder.
2. Both provisions were added in the Revenue Act of 1921. The Like Kind RuleRevenue Act, Pub. L. No. 67-98, ch. 136, § 202 (c)(1), 42 Stat. 227,230 (1921) (codified
as amended at I.R.C. § 1031 (2000)); Involuntary Conversion Rule-Revenue Act, Pub.
L. No. 67-98, ch. 136, §§ 214(a)(12), 234(a)(14), 42 Stat. 227,241,257 (1921) (codified
as amended at I.R.C. § 1033 (2000)). The like kind rule remained substantially
unchanged until 1984, when amendments were made to address deferred exchanges and
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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that no gain or loss is recognized if property held for productive use in the
taxpayer's trade or business or for investment is exchanged for property of a like
kind that is also held for productive use in a trade or business or for investment.3
This provision does not apply to exchanges of inventory property and other
property held primarily for sale, nor does it apply to financial assets such as
stocks, bonds, partnership interests, and the like.' A taxpayer is required to
recognize realized gain under the rule to the extent that she received money and
non-like kind property in the exchange.'
The involuntary conversion rule permits elective nonrecognition of gain
where property is condemned (or sold pursuant to a threat of condemnation),
destroyed, or stolen and the taxpayer uses the conversion proceeds to purchase
"property similar or related in service or use" (or a controlling stock interest in
a corporation owning such property) generally within two years of the
involuntary conversion.' For certain condemnations of real property, like kind

exchanges ofpartnership interests. See generally Marjorie E. Komhauser, Section 1031:
We Don't Need Another Hero, 60 S. CAL. L. Rn'V. 397 (1987). In 1989 and 1997,
changes to the like kind rule were also made that deny like kind treatment for exchanges
of U.S. and foreign property, as well as for certain exchanges between related parties.
Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 7601, 103 Stat. 2301,237071 (1989); Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 1052, 111 Stat. 788, 940
(1997). The involuntary conversion rule first appeared as a deduction provision (with
a carryover basis provision), but was changed to a nonrecognition rule in 1924. See
Revenue Act, Pub. L. No. 68-176, ch. 234, § 203(b)(5), 43 Stat. 253, 256 (1924). The
rule originally employed a requirement that conversion proceeds be traced to the
investment in the replacement property. In 1951, Congress replaced the tracing
requirement with aprovision requiring that the replacement property be purchased within
generally one year ofthe conversion. Internal Revenue Code Amendments, Pub. L. No.
82-251, 65 Stat. 733, 733-36 (1951). The general replacement period was extended to
two years in 1969. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 915(a), 83 Stat. 487,
723 (1969). Other significant amendments to the involuntary conversion rule include the
following: the addition in 1958 of Section 1033(g), which allows a taxpayer to replace
condemned business or investment real property with like kind property, Internal
Revenue Code Amendments, Pub. L. No. 85-866, § 46(a), 72 Stat. 1606, 1641 (1958);
the addition in 1995 of Section 1033(i), which denies nonrecognition treatment for
certain situations where replacement property is acquired from related parties, Internal
Revenue Code Amendments, Pub. L. No. 104-7, § 3(a)(1), 109 Stat. 93, 94 (1995); and
the addition in 1996 of Section 1033(b)(3), which requires certain reductions in the basis
of a corporation's assets where the replacement property is stock in a corporation,
Internal Revenue Code Amendments, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1610(a), 110 Stat. 1755,
1844-45 (1996).
3. I.R.C. § 103 1(a)(1) (2000).
4. Id. § 1031(a)(2).
5. Id. § 1031(b).
6. Id. § 1033(a)(2).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss4/1
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replacement property is treated as satisfying the similar property standard.' A
taxpayer is required to recognize realized gain under the provision to the extent
that the proceeds from the involuntary conversion exceed the cost of the similar
replacementproperty. 8 Both the like kind and involuntary conversion provisions
are accompanied by special basis rules that preserve in the replacement property
any realized gain (or loss in the case of the like kind rule) that went
unrecognized on the transactions. 9
Commentators have questioned the policy grounds for the like kind rule in
general, ° and for some of its particular features, such as the exchange
requirement." Congress and its staffers have also noted the complexity caused
by certain aspects of the rule and have enacted or proposed remedial changes in
this regard.' 2 The involuntary conversion rule also contributes to the complexity
of the tax system given the fact-intensive analysis that it requires.' 3 Perhaps more
fundamentally, the two nonrecognition rules generally use different standards for
determining eligible replacement property, an apparent inconsistency that
occasionally catches the attention of both Congress 4 and commentators.'"

7. Id. § 1033(g).
8. Id. § 1033(a)(2).
9. Id. §§ 1031(d), 1033(b).
10. See generally Komhauser, supra note 2; Erik M. Jensen, The Uneasy
Justificationfor Special Treatment of Like Kind Exchanges, 4 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 193
(1985).
11. See generally Steven J.Willis, Of[ImipermissibleIllogic & Section 1031, 34
U. FLA. L. REV. 72 (1981).
12. See H.R. REP. No. 98-432, pt. 2, at 1232-1233 (1984) (noting the
administrative problems created by like kind treatment of non-simultaneous exchanges
under pre-1984 law); S. PRT. 98-169, Vol. Iat 242-43 (1984) (noting the administrative
problems created by like kind treatment of non-simultaneous exchanges under pre-1984
law); STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., STUDY OF THE OVERALL
STATE OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM & RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SIMPLIFICATION,

PURSUANT TO SECTION 8022(3)(B) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1986, Vol.1 at
300-05 (Conmm. Print 2001) (pointing out complexities caused by the exchange and
holding requirements).
13. See MICHAELJ. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENKFEDERALINCOMETAXATION:
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 642 (4th ed. 2001) (noting the uncertainty that results under
the involuntary conversion rule's similar property standard).
14. See S.REP.NO. 85-1983, at 4793-94, reprintedin 1958-3 C.B. 993-994 (seeing
no reason why substantially similar rules should not be used for determining eligible
replacement property for voluntary dispositions and condemnations of business or
investment real property).
15. See Earle E. Endelman, Comment, Involuntary Conversions Under Section
1033: An Appraisal, 10 WAYNE L. REV. 588, 594 (1964) (arguing against a stricter
standard under Section 1033 as compared to Section 1031).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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This Article seeks to improve the like kind and involuntary conversion
rules, that is, make the provisions more rational and less complex, by analyzing
them in light of the fundamental tax policies of efficiency, equity, and
administrability. A review of these rules under efficiency and equity principles
arguably will lead to a more rational scheme for providing nonrecognition
treatment to voluntary and involuntary dispositions given the recognized
importance of these policies in structuring the federal income tax system.
Further, a careful consideration of tax administration concerns should serve to
simplify the application of these nonrecognition provisions.
Part II of this Article reviews the fundamental tax policies of efficiency,
equity, and administrability. Part III examines the policies underlying the like
kind and involuntary conversion rules and identifies the fundamental policies
that may support these provisions. Part IV develops a methodology for
reforming the like kind and involuntary conversion rules in light of fundamental
tax policies that, in part, recognizes the limits of efficiency and equity analyses
and the importance of administrability concerns. Part V then applies this
methodology for reform to several features of the like kind and involuntary
conversion rules, and recommends an approach that is generally simpler, more
rational, and more unified. Part VI summarizes and concludes this Article.
II. FUNDAMENTAL TAX POLICIES
Tax theorists often base their analyses on a trio of fundamental policy
concerns: efficiency, equity, and tax administration. 6 While these scholars may
use other policies as well, this Article's analysis of the like kind and involuntary
conversion rules is based solely on these three fundamental tax policy concerns.
Before analyzing the policies underlying the nonrecognition rules for like kind
exchanges and involuntary conversions, it may be useful to review briefly these
fundamental tax policies.
A. Efficiency
Tax efficiency is concerned with minimizing tax-induced changes in
taxpayer behavior or decisions, or what are referred to as "substitution effects." 7
16. See, e.g., GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 13, at 25-29; David J. Shakow,
Taxation Without Realization: A Proposalfor Accrual Taxation, 134 U. PA. L. REV.
1111, 1114-18 (1986); S. REP. No. 99-313, at 3-8 (1986).
17. See Daniel N. Shaviro, An Efficiency Analysis ofRealization andRecognition
Under the FederalIncome Tax, 48 TAX L. REV. 1, 4 (1992). This efficiency norm is
aimed at minimizing excess burden. See id. at 4. There is a different efficiency norm,

one that is not used in this Article, for Pegouvian taxes that are designed to adjust for
factors that prevent the market from functioning perfectly, such as externalities,
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss4/1
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By being neutral at important decisional points, the tax system can minimize taxinduced changes in behavior. 8 In applying an efficiency analysis to the
realization rule, and related features such as nonrecognition provisions and the
capital gains rate, tax theorists have identified two important decisional
moments: (i) the time that a taxpayer decides to acquire an asset ('Time One"),
and (ii) the time the taxpayer decides to dispose of an asset ("Time Two"). 9 At
Time One, the differences in effective tax rates caused by the realization rule
(among other features of the tax system) probably cause taxpayers to invest in
certain assets over others. For example, because yield assets that produce
currently taxed income do not benefit from the deferred taxation under the
realization rule to the same extent as growth assets, the tax system encourages

inadequate economic growth, and underemployment ofresources. See Charles R. Hulten
& Robert A. Klayman, Investment Incentives in Theory & Practice, in UNEASY
COMPROMISE: PROBLEMS OFAHYBRID INCOME-CONSUMPTiON TAX317,328-30 (Henry
J. Aaron et al. eds., 1988); Eric M. Zolt, The Uneasy CaseforUniform Taxation, 16 VA.
TAx REv. 39, 69-72 (1996) (stating that market imperfections may justify departures
from uniform taxation). Similar to determining optimal income tax rates, designing
Pegouvian taxes that are aimed at overcoming market imperfections would require vast
amounts of information about the economy, and, thus, there would appear to be a strong
practical case against employing such taxes. Cf. Hulten & Klayman, supra, at 318
(stating that it would be virtually impossible to obtain the information necessary to
determine optimal tax rates); RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC
FINANCE INTHEORY & PRACTICE 293 (5th ed. 1989) (pointing out that despite optimal
taxation theory, because of a lack of needed economic information, there is a practical
case in favor of neutral taxation based on the view that more harm than good might be
done by misguided differentiation). Consequently, I limit the efficiency analysis in this
Article to that of minimizing excess burden.
Reducing administrative and compliance costs can be viewed as another objective
of tax efficiency, as these costs along with tax-induced behavioral changes contribute to
excess burden. Shaviro, supra, at 4. Nevertheless, this Article addresses administrative
and compliance aspects separately from behavioral aspects, classifying the former as
administrative concerns and only the latter as efficiency concerns; this is consistent with
other analyses (see supra note 16) and appears appropriate given the possibly greater
degree ofcertainty in evaluating administrative costs as compared to costs resulting from
tax-induced behavioral changes. Cf. Mark P. Gergen, The Logic of Deterrence:
CorporateTax Shelters, 55 TAX L. REV. 255,274-75 (2002) (stating that the most easily
measured social costs of tax shelters are the tax planning costs associated with such
strategies, as compared to the difficulty of measuring the magnitude of the social costs
that result from the revenue loss due to tax shelters, including the allocative effects of
taxpayers' responses to lower effective tax rates).
18. Shaviro, supra note 17, at 4.
19. See Shaviro, supra note 17, at 25. I acknowledge Professor Shaviro for both
pointing out these important decisional moments and labeling them so succinctly.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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overinvestment in growth assets.2" Consequently, theorists use tax efficiency as
apolicybasis for accrual21 andretrospective taxation2 schemes, which generally
would tend to bring about more equal tax rates on capital income. 2 3 At Time
Two, the realization rule also affects the behavior of taxpayers by inducing them
to refrain from changing investments because of the lower (or possibly zero)
effective tax rates for longer holding periods (the so-called lock-in effect). Thus,
even though a taxpayer holding an asset may want to diversify her risk, or
believes other investments will yield higher returns, she may refrain from selling
the asset in order to benefit from further tax deferral, thereby experiencing a taxinducedportfolio reallocation.24 Proponents of accrual and retrospective taxation
also refer to these Time Two efficiency costs of the realization rule in support
of their proposals.25 Features such as the capital gains rate and nonrecognition
provisions result in both Time Two efficiency benefits and Time One efficiency
costs; that is, by lowering (or deferring) the tax upon dispositions, these features
both reduce the lock-in effect as well as increase the tax incentive for investing
in certain assets benefitting from the realization requirement. For features such
as these, it is necessary to employ an efficiency analysis that attempts to evaluate
the net efficiency benefit or cost resulting from the provision under scrutiny.2"
B. Equity
Tax equity is usually broken down into two equity norms: horizontal equity
and vertical equity.27 Horizontal equity requires that similarly situated taxpayers

20. Fred B. Brown, "Complete" Accrual Taxation, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1559,

1571-72 (1996).
21. Accrual taxation includes in the tax base annual increases and decreases in the
value of property, regardless of a disposition. Id. at 1560.
22. Retrospective taxation awaits a disposition to impose tax, but attempts to
approximate accrual taxation by generally imposing an interest charge for the period
between the accrual of the gains and the disposition of the property. See Mary Louise
Fellows, A Comprehensive Attack on Tax Deferral, 88 MICH. L. REv. 722, 792-97
(1990).
23. See Brown, supra note 20, at 1568-73; Fellows, supranote 22, at 727.
24. See Brown, supra note 20, at 1569-70.
25. See Brown, supranote 20, at 1569-70; Fellows, supranote 22, at 727.
26. See Shaviro, supra note 17, at 25; George R. Zodrow, Economic Analyses of
CapitalGainsTaxation: Realizations,Revenues, Efficiency, andEquity,48 TAXL. REV.
419, 469 (1993).
27. See, e.g., Boris I. Bittker, Equity, Efficiency, and Income Tax Theory: Do
MisallocationsDrive Out Inequities?, in THE ECONOMICS OF TAXATION 19 (Henry J.
Aaron & Michael J. Boskin eds., 1980).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss4/1
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be taxed in a similar manner.28 Tax theorists traditionally use horizontal equity
to support measures aimed at having persons with equal economic income bear
an equal tax burden, although the process of tax arbitrage can make the case
against tax preferences somewhat less certain.' Vertical equity requires that
differently situated taxpayers be treated in an appropriately different manner.
Vertical equity is often used to justify the progressive rate structure, under which
taxpayers with greater amounts of economic income are generally taxed more
heavily than those with lesser amounts.3" Tax theorists also use vertical equity
principles to denounce tax benefits that are more widely available to higher
income taxpayers. 3'
Over the last decade, a debate has ensued over whether horizontal equity
has any significance independent of vertical equity.32 Professor Kaplow argues
that horizontal equity is not an independent norm and that it is merely derivative
of vertical equity: subjecting equals to the same tax burden automatically
follows from imposing different tax burdens on unequals 3 That is, if based on
one's concept of vertical equity, individuals with incomes of $200,000 or more
are taxed at a forty percent rate, and those with incomes of less than $200,000

28. See id.
29. See id. at 22-27; Brown, supra note 20, at 1574-76. Tax arbitrage is the
process in which investors tend to be drawn to a tax-favored investment, thus, in theory
reducing the investment's pre-tax rate of return until the after-tax rate of return is equal
to that of equally risky investments. With the tax preference completely capitalized into
the cost of the investment, the purchaser of a tax-favored asset would appear to receive
only normal after-tax returns. Consequently, in this case horizontal equity is apparently
not violated-despite a lower direct tax liability, the investor is also subject to an indirect
tax as a result of the reduced pre-tax returns. Complete arbitrage probably does not
occur, however; that is, investors will probably not be drawn to a tax-favored investment
to the degree necessary to completely capitalize the cost of the tax preference.
Consequently, behavioral adjustments to tax preferences probably only mitigate, rather
than eliminate, horizontal equity. In addition, certain preferences, such as the differing
effective tax rates resulting from the realization requirement, will vary based on the
individual circumstances of a particular investor. For preferences ofthis type, even with
complete arbitrage, horizontal equity will be eliminated only where the effective tax rate
applying to the investor is the same rate that is implicit in the market capitalization,
which is not a likely occurrence. See Brown, supranote 20, at 1574-76.
30. See GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 13, at 25.
31. See Reed Shuldiner, A General Approach to the Taxation of Financial
Instruments, 71 TEX. L. REV. 243, 261-62 (1992) (referring to the benefit of deferral
under the realization rule).
32. See, e.g., Paul R. McDaniel & James R. Repetti, Horizontal and Vertical
Equity: The Musgrave/KaplowExchange, I FLA. TAX REV. 607 (1993).
33. See Louis Kaplow, HorizontalEquity: Measures in Search of a Principle,42
NAT'L TAX. J. 139 (1989).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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are taxed at a twenty percent rate, it necessarily follows that individuals with the
same amount of income are taxed at the same rate. As Professors Cunningham
and Schenk point out, equally taxing individuals with the same income does not
mean that vertical equity is satisfied; a tax system that reversed the rate structure
described above would satisfy horizontal equity but would likely violate most
conceptions of vertical equity. 4 Moreover, as stated by Professors McDaniel
and Repetti, vertical equity is also not an independent norm, but instead rests on
one's theory of distributive justice.3 5 Consequently, both horizontal equity and
vertical equity are corollaries of some theory of distributivejustice that supports
a certain distribution of the tax burden. Nonetheless, horizontal equity can still
serve an important function in determining whether the tax system advances
distributive justice; specifically, where equals are not treated in an equal fashion,
vertical equity and, by implication, distributive justice, is violated. Thus,
horizontal equity can provide a convenient measure for evaluating whether the
tax system is at odds with the normative principles underlying equity.
C. Administrability
Administrability is concerned with reducing the complexity of the tax
system. Among the sources of complexity in the tax law are the intricacy of
certain statutory and regulatory provisions, the ambiguity presented by
provisions with more than one possible meaning, and the uncertainty created by
vague provisions where additional official guidance is lacking. 36 Complexity
causes burdens for taxpayers in their attempts to comply with law;37 it also
results in more tax planning by taxpayers along with its attendant costs. 38 With
greater complexity, taxpayer noncompliance would appear likely to increase;39

taxpayers may find it too difficult or too troublesome to fully comply, may take
advantage of "gray areas" that result from complexity, or simply may not comply

34. See Nohel B. Cunningham & Deborah H. Schenk, The Casefor a Capital
Gains Preference,48 TAX. L. REV. 319, 363 (1993).
35. See McDaniel & Repetti, supra note 32, at 611.
36. Cf STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., STUDY OF THE
OVERALL STATE OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM & RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
SIMPLIFICATION, PURSUANTTO SECTION 8022(3)(B) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF

1986, VOL. I at 5 (Comm. Print 2001) (noting that a source of complexity is a lack of
clarity and readability of the law, which can result from overly technical or overly vague
statutory language, as well as too much or too little guidance on certain issues).

37. See id. at 6.
38. Seeid. at42.
39. See id. at 6 (noting it is widely reported that complexity reduces the levels of
voluntary compliance; pointing out, however, that it is not possible to measure the effects
of complexity on the levels of voluntary compliance).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss4/1
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because of a loss of respect for the tax system. Complexity also burdens the IRS
and Treasury, given that the government is called upon to issue more guidance
in the form of regulations and rulings,' as well as expend more effort in dealing
with taxpayer noncompliance, whether actual or alleged. Complexity adversely
affects the courts as well, by creating more instances where the judiciary needs
to resolve taxpayer-government disputes over intricate, ambiguous, or uncertain
tax rules. 4 It stands to reason that duplicative tax rules--different rules that deal
with similar situations-add to complexity by creating more instances where
there is potential for intricacy, ambiguity, and uncertainty.42
While continually a concern for tax scholars and policymakers,
simplification may once again be at the top ofCongress' tax reform agenda with
the recent release of a simplification study prepared by the staff of the Joint
Committee on Taxation, recommending several hundred changes to the Code in
order to simplify the tax system.43 Included among the recommendations are
proposals aimed at eliminating duplicative tax rules."
D. BalancingCompetingPolicy Objectives
The tax law often reflects a balance of competing policy objectives. In
particular, administrative considerations may take precedence over the other
fundamental tax policy concerns. For example, while efficiency and equity
concerns appear to support the use of accrual taxation for asset appreciation and
depreciation, the realization rule is generally used because of the administrative
difficulties presented by accrual taxation (that is, valuation and taxpayer
illiquidity).4 5 Similarly, because of administrative concerns, the tax system does
not tax the imputed income on owner-occupied housing, nor does it index the

40. Cf.id. at 6 (pointing out that complexity makes it more difficult for the IRS to
explain the tax law through published guidance).

41. Cf. id. at 7 (noting as a factor in identifying provisions that add complexity the
extent to which a rule results in disputes between taxpayers and the IRS).

42. Cf.id. at 7, 9 (noting as a factor in identifying provisions that add complexity
the existence of multiple provisions with similar objectives; analyzing simplification

recommendations from the perspective of whether the provision could be eliminated
because it is duplicative).
43. See generally id.
44. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 12, at 253

(recommending one definition of family for purposes ofthe constructive stock ownership
rules); STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 36, at 52 (recommending

one definition of qualifying child for purposes of the earned income credit, the child
credit, the dependency exemption, the dependent care credit, and head of household

filing status).
45. See Brown, supranote 20, at 1560-61.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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basis of assets for inflation, even though strong efficiency and equity arguments
can be made for these measures.' While it seems that efficiency and equity may
more often yield to administrability in deciding among major features of the tax
system, the reverse occurs as well; for example, the system strives to tax net
income, as opposed to gross income, a much simpler determinant, because of the
undesirable efficiency and equity consequences that would result from a gross
income tax.
III. FUNDAMENTAL TAX POLICIES UNDERLYING THE LIKE KIND AND
INVOLUNTARY CONVERSION RULES

This Part examines the policies in support of nonrecognition treatment for
like kind exchanges and involuntary conversions. The focus here is to determine
what fundamental tax policies, if any, underlie these nonrecognition provisions.
A. PoliciesSupporting the Like Kind Rule
Nonrecognition treatment for like kind exchanges has been justified on
continuity of investment grounds; that is, to the extent that a taxpayer continues
an investment in similar property, she has not effectively realized a profit on the
disposition, similar in effect to the taxpayer continuing to hold the original
property.47 Probably with less emphasis, the like kind provision has also been
justified on administrative grounds because of valuation difficulties and taxpayer
liquidity concerns.'
The continuity of investment rationale by itself, however, is not what I
would view as a fundamental tax policy basis; this rationale does not expressly
relate either to efficiency, equity, or administrability. Yet, where a taxpayer has
continued her investment despite a disposition, efficiency as well as horizontal
equity may support nonrecognition treatment.
As demonstrated by Professor Shaviro, efficiency concerns provide a
plausible justification for the like kind provision.4 9 Where a taxpayer is viewed
as continuing her investment, she ends with property that bears some similarity

46. See DEP'T OF TREASURY, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAx REFORM 86 (1977)

(discussing the taxation of imputed income on owner-occupied housing). See generally
Reed Shuldiner, Indexing the Tax Code, 48 TAX L. REv. 537 (1993) (analyzing

indexation).
47. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 98-432, pt. 2, at 1232 (1984); S. PRT. 98-169, Vol. I

at 242 (1984); Jensen, supranote 10, at 199-207.
48. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 98-432; S. PRT. 98-169, Vol. I at 242 (1984);
Kornhauser, supra note 2, at 407.
49. See Shaviro, supranote 17, at 45.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss4/1
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to what she had originally, thus, resulting in a perceived lack of significant
change in her position."0 In the absence of nonrecognition treatment, the
taxpayer may be deterred by the tax consequences from engaging in such
5
transactions, given its relative lack of significance apart from tax consequences;
in other words, such transactions are relatively tax-elastic. In contrast,
transactions that significantly change a taxpayer's position, such as cash sales or
non-like kind exchanges, are less tax-elastic; that is, taxing these transactions is
less likely to deter them. 2 Consequently, the like kind exchange rules may
produce efficiency benefits at Time Two by providing nonrecognition treatment
to transactions that are more tax elastic, thereby avoiding the deterrence of these
transactions and reducing tax-induced changes in behavior.5 3
Professor Shaviro also points out, however, that allowing nonrecognition
treatment for like kind exchanges may also produce efficiency costs. 4 Allowing
nonrecognition treatment for certain transactions at Time Two decreases the
expected taxation at Time One on assets benefitting from the realization
requirement, thereby providing a greater tax incentive to invest in these assets
as opposed to assets whose income is taxed currently. 5 As noted earlier, the
realization requirement results in varying effective tax rates on capital income,
which in turn causes Time One distortions.56
With the prospect of
nonrecognition for like kind exchanges and other situations, taxpayers would
have an even greater tax incentive to invest in certain assets benefitting from the
realization requirement, thus, increasing the Time One distortions and efficiency
costs. In addition, nonrecognition treatment for like kind exchanges may
produce Time Two distortions: taxpayers who would otherwise engage in cash

50. See Shaviro, supranote 17, at 45.
51. See Shaviro, supra note 17, at 45. This appears to be part of the original
rationale for the enactment of the like kind rule. See S. REP. No. 67-275, reprintedin
1939-1 C.B. 189 (providing that the like kind rule, as well as a nonrecognition rule
applying to certain corporate reorganizations and formations, permits "business to go
forward with the readjustments required by existing conditions" by "eliminating many
technical constructions which are economically unsound"). In enacting the like kind rule
and other nonrecognition provisions in the Revenue Act of 1921, Congress may also
have been motivated by a desire to provide tax benefits to the business community. See
infra notes 70, 214.
52. See Shaviro, supranote 17, at 31-32.
53. See Shaviro, supra note 17, at 45.
54. See Shaviro, supranote 17, at 45.
55. See Shaviro, supra note 17, at 25-28, 45.
56. For example, because growth assets, such as land, receive a greater relative
benefit from the realization rule's deferred taxation than yield assets, such as some
financial instruments, overinvestment in growth assets is encouraged by the tax system.
See Brown, supranote 20, at 1571-72.
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sales or non-like kind exchanges would have a tax incentive for engaging in like
kind exchanges.57
Taken together, the efficiency case for the like kind rule is a balance of
these benefits and costs. On the one hand, nonrecognition treatment for like kind
exchanges produces efficiency benefits at Time Two by allowing relatively taxelastic transactions not to be deterred by current taxation. On the other hand, the
like kind rule results in efficiency costs by increasing the tax incentive at Time
One for investing in assets benefitting from the realization requirement and the
like kind provision, as well as by providing a tax incentive at Time Two for
engaging in a like kind exchange as opposed to a cash sale or non-like kind
exchange. It is unclear which way this balance tips given the enormous
challenges involved in obtaining the needed empirical data on tax elasticities and
welfare losses.5" Nonetheless, while there is uncertainty, it is at least plausible
that efficiency considerations support nonrecognition treatment for like kind
exchanges.59
On the other hand, upon first analysis, it would seem that horizontal equity
provides no guidance on the propriety of the like kind exchange provision. After
all, the usual basis for making horizontal equity comparisons is the ability to pay
tax, and economic income is often viewed as the best measure of ability to pay;'
with this comparative basis, it is unclear whether providing nonrecognition
treatment to like kind transactions promotes equity. For example, assume that
there are three taxpayers who each purchased an asset on January 1, 2001 for
$100. On December 31, 2001, each asset is worth $200. On December 31,
2001, the first taxpayer sells her asset for $200 in cash, the second taxpayer
exchanges her asset for a like kind asset worth $200, and the third taxpayer
continues to hold her asset until the close of the year. All three taxpayers had
$100 of economic income during 2001, yet the third taxpayer will be able to
defer the tax on the $100 of income, while the first taxpayer will be liable for a
current tax, thus, experiencing a higher effective tax rate on the income.
Providing nonrecognition treatment to the like kind exchanger treats the
exchanger like the continued holder, but creates horizontal inequity with the
seller. Similarly, imposing current tax on the exchanger produces equity with
the seller but not with the holder. Consequently, horizontal equity is violated

57. See Shaviro, supra note 17, at 25; Lawrence Trent, Comment, Tax-Free
Exchanges of Like Kind Investment or Business Property: A ProposalforLegislative
Revision ofInternalRevenueCode Section 1031,53 S. CAL. L. REV.355, 371-72 (1979);
Komhauser, supra note 2, at 411.

58. See Shaviro, supranote 17, at 6, 25, 32, 66.
59. See Shaviro, supra note 17, at 6, 45, 66.
60. See, e.g., Cunningham & Schenk, supra note 34, at 364.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss4/1
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with economic income as the comparative basis, regardless of whether the
second taxpayer receives nonrecognition treatment on the like kind exchange.6'
Thus, given the failure of our realization based tax system to reach
economic income as it accrues, traditional horizontal equity analysis provides no
guidance on whether the system should contain the like kind rule. One
possibility then would be to ignore completely horizontal equity considerations
in evaluating the like kind rule. Alternatively, in situations such as this where
assumed features of the tax system (here, the realization requirement) foreclose
an equity analysis based on economic income, one could refer to another type of
equity, that is, perceptional equity, for guidance. That is, in deciding on the
propriety of the like kind rule, one might consider whether or not the provision
is perceived as equitable. 2 Before proceeding further, it is necessary to explain
the reasons why it might be appropriate to consider perceptional equity.
Looking to perceptional equity for guidance where traditional equity provides
none would at least allow equity in some form to enter into the analysis
regarding the propriety of the like kind rule. In this regard, perceptional equity
arguably has value in that taxpayers' beliefs regarding fairness may significantly
affect whether the tax system is fair.63 As Jane Gravelle points out, "the
perception of unfair treatment can alter welfare as well as the reality.""

61. Cf.David A. Weisbach, Should a Short Sale Against the Box Be a Realization
Event?, 50 NAT'L TAX J.495, 497-98 (1997) (reaching a similar conclusion upon
analyzing a short against the box tax proposal under horizontal equity, with economic
income as the comparative base).
62. Other commentators similarly have noted the importance of perceptional
equity. See, e.g., Cunningham & Schenk, supra note 34, at 368-69.
63. See James W. Wetzler, The Role of Fairnessin State Tax Policy, 47 REC.
ASS'N B. CITY N.Y. 38, 39 (1992) ("Fairness is a question largely of perception: a tax
system is fair when taxpayers believe that their tax burdens are not out of line with their
situations and to burdens imposed on other taxpayers."); Charles E. McLure, Jr.,
Comments, in Do TAXES MATTER? 332, 333 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1992) ("[P]erhaps the
perception of fairness should be elevated to equal status with the traditional goals.").
64. Jane G. Gravelle, Comments on M. Graetz andE.Sunley, Minimum Taxes and
ComprehensiveTax Reform, in UNEASY COMPROMISE: PROBLEMS OFAHYBRID INCOMECONSUMPTION TAX 419, 423 (Henry J.Aaron et al. eds., 1988); see Edward J.
McCaffery, CapitalGains: Fhat'sthe Point, and Are We MissingIt?, 43 TAX NOTES
223, 224 (1989) (stating that psychic value costs may make a capital gains rate cut
undesirable). The use of perceptional equity in this context bears some similarity to the
use of second-best efficiency analysis to evaluate features of the tax system such as the
capital gains preference. Because of distortions caused by the realization requirement,
in particular, the lock-in effect, an efficiency analysis of the capital gains preference
focuses on reducing inefficiencies produced by the realization requirement, rather than
on eliminating such inefficiencies entirely. See, e.g., Cunningham & Schenk, supranote
34, at 360-75. Arguably similar, the analysis here assumes the horizontal inequities
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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Moreover, perceptions of inequity may adversely affect compliance with the tax
laws by undermining taxpayer morale, which is very important in a tax system
based on self-assessment.6 5
Applying horizontal equity in the perceptional sense, however, leads to no
firm conclusions regarding the like kind rule. On the one hand, a taxpayer
involved in a like kind exchange, despite the disposition, continues to hold
property that is similar to the property exchanged, and, thus, may be perceived
as similarly situated to a taxpayer who continues to hold the same property;
consequently, because the continued holder would have no recognized gain, then
neither should the like kind exchanger." On the other hand, it can be contended
that because of the disposition, a taxpayer involved in a like kind exchange
should not be perceived as similarly situated to a taxpayer who continues to hold
the same property, and that the closer comparison is to a taxpayer who
voluntarily disposes of her property either for cash or non-like kind property in
a taxable transaction, and, thus, the like kind exchanger should be treated the
same.

Besides continuity of investment, the other purported justification for the
like kind rule is tax administration. While possibly implicated, however,
administrability is not a key rationale for the like kind rule. Although like kind
exchanges may raise valuation issues, this would generally only be the case for
two party like kind exchanges. It would appear that most like kind exchanges
today are of the three cornered variety, and these transactions very typically
involve a transfer of money equal to either the value of the relinquished property
or that of the replacement property; consequently, for these exchanges, valuation
is not an obstacle to current taxation, given that the parties will, in effect, be
valuing the relinquished (or replacement) property at a specific dollar amount.67
(based on economic income) created by the realization requirement, but attempts to
evaluate whether provisions such as the like kind rule (as well as the involuntary
conversion rule, which is analyzed below) reduce overall inequity by advancing
perceptions of equity.
65. See, e.g., Charles E. McLure, Jr., The Budget Process and Tax
Simplification/Complication,45 TAX L. REV. 25, 57 (1989); Cunningham & Schenk,
supra note 34, at 368; Michael J. Graetz & Emil M. Sunley, Minimum Taxes &
Comprehensive Tax Reform, in UNEASY COMPROMISE: PROBLEMS OF AHYBRID INCOME-

CONSUMPTION TAX 385,405 (Henry J. Aaron et al. eds., 1988); Gravelle, supra note 64,
at 423; Tracy A. Kaye, Sheltering Social Policy in the Tax Code: The Low-Income
Housing Credit, 38 VILL. L. REv. 872, 917-22 (1993).

66. Cf. Jordan Marsh Co. v. Commissioner, 269 F.2d 453, 456 (2d Cir. 1959)
(determining that in enacting the like kind rule, "Congress was primarily concerned with
the inequity... of forcing a taxpayer to recognize a paper gain which was still tied up

in a continuing investment of the same sort").
67. See Richard David Harroch, Comment, Section 1031 Exchanges: Step
TransactionAnalysis and the Needfor LegislativeAmendment, 24 UCLA L. REV. 351,
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss4/1
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Even for two party like kind exchanges, valuation difficulties must not be a
major justification for nonrecognition treatment; otherwise, all in kind
exchanges, whether like kind or not, would be treated as nonrecognition events.6"
Similarly, taxpayer illiquidity, another possible administrative concern, is not a
concern in commonly used deferred exchanges,69 and in any event, would justify
nonrecognition treatment for all in kind exchanges.7"
B. PoliciesSupportingthe Involuntary Conversion Rule
Nonrecognition treatment for involuntary conversions is often justified on
equitable grounds; that is, it would be unfair to require a taxpayer to recognize
gain where there is forced realization followed by a re-investment in similar
property. 7' Missing from the usual justification is an elaboration as to why gain
recognition would be inequitable under these circumstances. 2 Arguably,
horizontal equity notions provide a rationale for the involuntary conversion rule.
As with like kind exchanges, horizontal equity would need to be applied not in
the traditional sense, that is, with economic income as the basis for comparison,
but in the perceptional sense.73 Under this mode ofanalysis, it would appear that
a strong case can be made for the involuntary conversion rule; that is, a taxpayer
who disposes of property pursuant to an involuntary conversion and acquires

358-59 (1976).
68. See JordanMarsh Co., 269 F.2d at 456; Komhauser, supra note 2, at 410;
Trent, supra note 57, at 358-59.
69. As discussed infra Part V.B, a deferred exchange is effectively a cash sale
followed by a re-investment of the proceeds.
70. Aside from the continuity of investment and administrativejustification for the
like kind rule, other considerations may have played a role in its enactment or continued
existence. Chief among these other factors may have been a desire on the part of
Congress to provide tax benefits to the business community, either for political reasons
or in order to provide an economic stimulus. See Kornhauser, supranote 2, at 433-41;
Trent, supra note 57, at 367. While either or both of these reasons may have been
important, I do not view them as fundamental tax policy bases for enacting or retaining
the like kind rule. Obviously, the desire to win the political support of certain taxpayers
should not form the basis of fundamental tax policy. Furthermore, although an efficiency
case (based on adjusting for market imperfections) may exist for providing economic
stimulus, it would appear that the existing knowledge regarding economics is insufficient
to support targeted tax subsidies intended to promote economic growth. See supranote
17.
71. See, e.g., MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: A LAW
STUDENT'S GUIDE TO THE LEADING CASES AND CONCEPTS 42, 334 (9th ed. 2002).
72. See, e.g., CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 71, at 42 (stating that it seems unfair to
subject the taxpayer to current taxation in these circumstances).
73. See supranotes 60-66 and accompanying text.
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similar property within a reasonable time period can be perceived as being
similarly situated to a taxpayer who continues to hold the same property.
Because the continued holder is not required to recognize gain, then apparently
neither should the taxpayer involved in the involuntary conversion.74 While the
involuntary converter did dispose of property, this disposition was forced upon
her and arguably should be ignored in the equity comparison, given that these
circumstances suggest that the taxpayer did not intend for the disposition to
occur.75 In this regard, the perceptional horizontal equity basis for the
involuntary conversion rule is more powerful than that for the like kind
provision, given that the latter involves voluntary dispositions. That is, as

74. See Joseph M. Dodge, Taxes and Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 143, 162-63
(1992) (viewing the involuntary conversion rule as justified by the policy of taxing
similarly situated investors the same). Subjecting an involuntary converter to current
taxation would result in a twofold burden for the taxpayer. First, in light of the time
value ofmoney, current taxation of asset appreciation results in a higher effective tax rate
as compared to deferred taxation. See, e.g., Mark P. Gergen, The Effects of Price
Volatility andStrategic Trading UnderRealization, ExpectedReturn andRetrospective
Taxation, 49 TAX L. REV. 209, 231-36 (1994). Second, with current taxation, an
involuntary converter that replaces the converted property may lack liquid funds to pay
the tax; as a result, the taxpayer may be required to use some ofthe conversion proceeds
to pay the current tax liability, thereby not replacing the converted property completely,
and possibly altering her business or investment operations. The continued holder, who
arguably should be perceived as similarly situated, faces neither of these burdens.
Professor Shaviro suggests that the liquidity problem could be addressed by
allowing involuntary converters to pay their tax liabilities on a deferred basis, as opposed
to granting nonrecognition treatment. See Shaviro, supra note 17, at 27. Such a
measure, however, would not eliminate the disparity in effective tax rates experienced
by involuntary converters and continued holders, and, therefore, would not be an
appropriate response if one accepts the perceptional horizontal equity case for the
involuntary conversion rule. Professor Shaviro is not evaluating the involuntary
conversion rule under equity considerations (see Shaviro, supranote 17, at 3), and, thus,
the problem that he identifies as well as his suggested solution relate only to efficiency
and administrabililty analyses of the provision.
75. Cf.LAURIE L. MALMAN ETAL., PROBLEMS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION

763 (1994) (stating that Section 1033 is premised on the hardship of

imposing taxation where it is unlikely that the taxpayer intended to dispose of the
property); GRAETZ & SCHENK, supranote 13, at 640 (stating that Congress considered
it unfair to impose a tax where the taxpayer probably did not intend to dispose of the
property and reinvests the conversion proceeds in replacement property); Lawrence A.
Frolick, PersonalInjuryCompensationas a TaxPreference,37 ME. L. REV. 1, 20 (1985)
(stating that the involuntary conversion rule allows taxpayers to elect out of an unplanned
disposition, thereby providing involuntary converters the same choice enjoyed by
taxpayers that voluntarily dispose of property); Mark A. Cochran, ShouldPersonallnjury
Damage Awards Be Taxed?, 38 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 43, 46-47 (1987) (stressing the
involuntary transaction aspect of Section 1033).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss4/1

16

Brown: Brown: Proposal to Reform the Like Kind and Involuntary Conversion Rules in Light
2002]
REFORMING CERTAINNONRECOGNITIONRULES
721
compared to a like kind exchanger, there is a considerably stronger claim that an
involuntary converterwho acquires similar property shouldbe perceived as more
closely situated to a continued holder of the same property, as opposed to a
taxpayer who voluntarily disposes of property in return for cash or dissimilar
property.
While perceptional horizontal equity may support the involuntary
conversion rules, efficiency concerns apparently do not. As Professor Shaviro
points out, because the conversions are involuntary, they would occur with or
without nonrecognition treatment; thus, the Time Two efficiency benefits that
result from the like kind rule, that is, avoiding the deterrence of tax-elastic
transactions, are not produced by the involuntary conversion provision."6
Consequently, only the efficiency costs ofnonrecognition appear to be present:
the Time One distortions that result from reducing the expected tax for assets
benefitting from the realization requirement and the Time Two distortions that
occur because of the tax incentive to use the conversion proceeds to acquire
similar replacement property."
IV. A METHODOLOGY FOR REFORMING THE LIKE KIND AND
INVOLUNTARY CONVERSION RULES IN LIGHT OF FUNDAMENTAL TAX
POLICIES THAT RECOGNIZES THE LIMITATIONS OF EFFICIENCY AND
EQUITY ANALYSES AND THE IMPORTANCE OF TAX ADMINISTRATION
As noted earlier, this Article aims to make the like kind and involuntary
conversion rules more rational and less complex by analyzing them in light of
fundamental tax policies. This Part addresses the methodology that will be
employed in reforming these nonrecognition rules. Before doing so, it is
important to explain the assumptions on which the following analysis is based.
The analysis in the previous Part suggests the like kind rule may bejustified
on efficiency grounds. The previous analysis also indicates that the involuntary
conversion rule may be supported by perceptional horizontal equity principles,

76. See Shaviro, supra note 17, at 46.
77. See Shaviro, supranote 17, at 46. Professor Shaviro notes, however, that taxfreerecoveries ofinsurance on personal assets underthe involuntary conversion rule may
produce efficiency benefits by decreasing the tax system's preexisting bias against
purchasing such insurance. See id.atn.180. The efficiency and equity consequences of
the involuntary conversion rule bear some similarity to the consequences of not using a
head tax to raise revenue. Even though a head tax would be the most efficient form of
taxation, undesirable equity consequences counsel against its use. Thus, in not using a
head tax, a decision has been made to tolerate efficiency costs in order to promote equity,
considerations that also appear to underlie the involuntary conversion rule.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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but apparently not by efficiency concerns; thus, the involuntary conversion rule
appears to be a product of competing policies, a phenomenon noted earlier.
The efficiency and horizontal equity bases for the like kind and involuntary
conversion rules, respectively, are not (and probably never will be) certain. The
efficiency case for the like kind rule faces daunting empirical challenges,78 while
the perceptional equity case for the involuntary conversion rule appears to be
laden with value judgments. Nevertheless, decisions about these rules need to
be made.79 Consequently, in analyzing the provisions in light of fundamental tax
policies, scholars and policymakers have no choice other than to make
reasonable assumptions as to whether the policies of efficiency or equity support
these nonrecognition rules. For the like kind rule, I assume for purposes of this
Article the correctness of the efficiency argument; that is, providing
nonrecognition treatment to voluntary transactions that result in a lack of
significant change in position produces efficiency benefits at Time Two that
outweigh the efficiency costs at Time One and Time Two. With regard to the
involuntary conversion provision, I assume the validity of the perceptional
horizontal equity rationale; that is, nonrecognition treatment should be accorded
to a taxpayer who involuntarily disposes of property and acquires insignificantly
different property within a reasonable time period because such a taxpayer is
perceived as similarly situated to a taxpayer who continues to hold the same
property.
Any revisions made to the like dnd and involuntary conversion rules
should be consistent with the fundamental tax policies that are assumed to
underlie the provisions. Perhaps of greater significance, however, in reforming
these nonrecognition rules are tax administration concerns. Although the rules
are not grounded on administrative considerations, such concerns are always of
importance in devising taxprovisions. Moreover, in this context administrability
should take on added significance, given that the efficiency and equity rationales
for these nonrecognition rules suggest with limited specificity the features that
the rules should contain. The efficiency case for the like kind rule depends in
part on determining tax elasticities, measurements that are difficult, if not
impossible, to make.8" Similarly, the perceptional horizontal equity case for the
involuntary conversion rule is based on judging whether the circumstances of a
taxpayer involuntarily disposing of property and acquiring similar property are
close enough to a taxpayer who continues to hold the same property, a decidedly
imprecise inquiry. As a result, even with the assumption that these policies

78. See Shaviro, supranote 17, at 6, 25, 32, 66.
79. Cf Shaviro, supra note 17, at 66 (pointing out the same about the realization

and recognition rules despite the empirical obstacles that limit an efficiency analysis of
these rules).

80. See Shaviro, supranote 17, at 32.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss4/1
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support the provisions, the efficiency and horizontal equity underpinnings of the
rules provide no more than broad generalizations as to the types of transactions
that warrant nonrecognition treatment-those transactions that result in a lack
of significant change in position.8' Therefore, in crafting the particular features
of the like kind and involuntary conversion rules, it may be uncertain as to which
of several design options would better promote the underlying policies given the
limitations of efficiency and equity analyses. Where this occurs, tax
administration concerns should be the deciding factor in selecting the particular
feature."2 With regard to certain features, however, it may be clear which design
option better advances efficiency or equity. If that option is also the most
administrable of the choices, the rules should employ it. If, on the other hand,
another option wouldbetter promote administrability, abalance should be struck
between efficiency (or equity) and simplification in deciding on the particular
feature. The next Part of this Article employs this reform methodology in
examining various features of the like kind and involuntary conversion rules.
V. EXAMINING THE FEATURES OF THE LIKE KIND AND INVOLUNTARY
CONVERSION RULES
This Part will apply the methodology for reform developed in the previous
Part to several features of the like kind and involuntary conversion rules. In
order to focus and limit the analysis, features of the rules were chosen for
examination based on both their relative importance and complexity. Relatively
important features are those that relate to satisfying the basic requirements for
nonrecognition treatment, such as the standard for determining eligible
replacement property and the required linkage between the disposition of the
relinquished property and acquisition of the replacement property. Complex
features are those that involve uncertainty or intricacy. Based on this selection
process, certain relatively important features will not be examined because they
are not complex (for example, the type of property excluded from the coverage
of the like kind rule),83 and certain complex features will not be examined

81. See infra notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
82. Cf. Weisbach, supra note 61, at 503-04 (concluding that administrative
considerations should dominate in crafting a rule treating short against the box and
related transactions as realization events, given the uncertain efficiency gains of the
proposal being evaluated).
83. See I.R.C. § 1031(a)(2) (2000). For the most part, determining whether
property is excluded from Section 103 1's coverage should be relatively straightforward,
given that the exclusions generally are categories of assets whose parameters do not
necessitate a fact-intensive analysis; that is, it is fairly easy to determine whether an asset
is stock, a bond, or the like. The Section 1031(a)(2)(A) exclusion for stock in trade or
other property held primarily for sale, however, does have the potential for generating
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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because they are not relatively important (for example, the related party rules
under both provisions)." Specifically, this Part will apply the reform
methodology to the following features of the like kind and involuntary
conversion rules: (i) the standards used for determining eligible replacement
property under both provisions, (ii) the exchange requirement under the like kind
rule, (iii) the replacement periods under both rules, (iv) the holding requirement
under the like kind rule, and (v) the controlling stock interest provision under the
involuntary conversion rule.
Except with respect to the determination of eligible replacement property,
it is not a primary goal of this Article to conform the nonrecognition rules for
voluntary dispositions and involuntary conversions of property. Nevertheless,
a by-product of the recommended reforms may be the general conformance of
these nonrecognition rules which in turn may result in additional tax
administration benefits. The last section of this Part explores these aspects.
A. The Standardsfor DeterminingEligible Replacement Property
1. One Versus Two Standards
The like kind provision and the involuntary conversion rules use separate
standards for determining eligible replacement property. For like kind
exchanges, the replacement property must be of "like kind" to the relinquished

administrative burdens because of the fact-specific and possibly nebulous inquiry
required by this exclusion. See Howard J. Levine, Taxfree Exchanges Under Section
1031, 567-3d TAX MGMT. A-29 (2001) (noting that with respect to certain taxpayers, it
may be difficult to determine the motive for holding a particular piece of property).
Nonetheless, similar exclusions for inventory and like property are contained in Sections
1221(a)(1) and 123 1(b)(1) (although, as illustrated by Black v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.
90, 96 (1960), these exclusions would appear to require a higher threshold in light of

their language providing that the property be held primarily for sale to customers in the
ordinary course of a business); consequently, regardless of Section 1031 treatment, a
similar inquiry would likely be required for purposes of determining capital gain versus
ordinary income treatment either on the sale of similar property held by the taxpayer or
the disposition of the relinquished property if the taxpayer receives boot in the
transaction. Therefore, it would appear that the Section 1031 (a)(2)(A) exclusion does not
add appreciably to the complexity of the tax law. In any event, it would appear that
efficiency concerns (along with the aforementioned administrability considerations)
support excluding inventory and the like from Section 1031 nonrecognition treatment;
because the amount of profits earned by sellers of inventory is greatly dependent on the
frequency of sales, dispositions of inventory property do not appear to be relatively taxelastic, and, thus, according like kind nonrecognition treatment to inventory dispositions
would not appear to produce efficiency benefits at Time Two.
84. See I.R.C. §§ 1031(f), 1033(i) (2000).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss4/1
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property."5 For involuntary conversions, the replacement property generally
must be "similar or related in service or use" to the relinquished property,86 with
an exception for condemnations of business or investment real estate where like
kind replacement property satisfies the similar property standard. The two
standards are quite different, with the like kind standard generally being the more
liberal and objective of the two." Given the similar function of these two
standards, the issue-arises as to whether the use of a single standard would better
promote fundamental tax policies.
The efficiency and horizontal equity underpinnings of the like kind and
involuntary conversion rules appear to provide as much support for a single
standard to determine eligible replacementproperty as they do for two standards.
As discussed previously, efficiency concerns are assumed to justify the like kind
rules because of the efficiency benefits that result from granting nonrecognition
treatment to relatively tax-elastic transactions.8 9 Because there is limited
knowledge regarding tax elasticities in this context," however, the efficiency
rationale for the like kind rule appears to call for no more precise a standard than
one that allows nonrecognition treatment for voluntary transactions which result
in a lack of significant change in the taxpayer's position.9' While, based on
reasonable assumptions, some types of replacements would clearly result in
significant changes (e.g., land replacing a speculative intangible) and others
would clearly not be significant (e.g., one piece of unimproved rural land for
another piece of unimproved rural land), there are probably a range of
transactions for which it cannot be determined with any confidence whether
efficiency would be promoted if nonrecognition treatment were permitted.
As noted earlier, horizontal equity principles are assumed to support the
involuntary conversion rule because of the perceived similarity between a
taxpayer who continues to hold the same property and a taxpayer who is forced
to dispose of property and ends up holding similar property. 2 Here too,

85. Id. § 103 1(a)(1).
86. Id. § 1033(a).
87. Id. § 1033(g).
88. See infra notes 110-31 and accompanying text.
89. Supra notes 49-59, 78-79 and accompanying text.
90. See Shaviro, supranote 17, at 32 ("[T]he tax elasticity of a transaction is an
empirical attribute that cannot be judged in the abstract, is hard to measure in practice,
and even if measured may change at any time.").
91. See Shaviro, supranote 17, at 33-34 (pointing out that nontax significance
matters in making a transaction less tax-elastic "because, the greater the range and
importance of the nontax implications of a decision, the more likely the taxpayer is to
have a strong preference, and the less likely the decision is to be in such close equipoise
that tax considerations will tip the balance").
92. See supra notes 71-77, 78-79 and accompanying text.
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however, the policy rationale does not dictate a precise standard for determining
eligible replacement property, given the imprecision involved in making equity
comparisons; thus, all that can be said is that the perceptional horizontal equity
basis for involuntary conversions supports nonrecognition treatment for those
conversions and replacements that result in a lack of significant change in the
taxpayer's position. The inexactitude of the equity determinations underlying
the involuntary conversion rule is underscored by the fact that the rule
effectively uses two different standards for involuntary conversions of real
property-the like kind test for condemnations of business or investment real
estate and the more narrow similar property standard for all other real property
conversions.93
Consequently, while different policy rationales underlie the two provisions,
each of the policies is rather indefinite in prescribing a standard for eligible
replacement property and appears to simply support a standard requiring that the
replacement property not be significantly different from the relinquished
property. As a result, it appears that these policies provide as much support for
a single standard that defines insignificantly different property for purposes of
determining eligible replacement property as they do for different standards.
In fact, additional horizontal equity considerations indicate that there may
be even more support for using a single standard.94 That is, the use of different

standards for voluntary and involuntary dispositions of property may violate
horizontal equity by generally imposing a stricter standard for achieving
nonrecognition treatment on a taxpayer who involuntarily disposes of property,
especially with regard to real property. For example, a taxpayer who suffers the
destruction of improved real estate and uses the conversion proceeds to acquire
unimproved real estate would have to recognize any realized gain on the
disposition,95 whereas a taxpayer who voluntarily exchanges improved real estate
for unimproved real estate would not.96 While the taxpayer involved in the
involuntary conversion temporarily held cash, and the taxpayer involved in the
like kind exchange did not, taxpayers involved in like kind exchanges can
achieve the economic effect of a sale and reinvestment through the use of

93. See I.R.C. § 1033(g) (2000).
94. Again, horizontal equity would have to be used in the perceptional sense. See
supranotes 60-66, 73-75 and accompanying text.
95. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1033(a)-2(c)(9)(i) (2001).
96. See id. § 1.1031(a)-l(c). This assumes the second taxpayer satisfies the
holding requirement under the like kind rule. A stricter standard also applies to
involuntary conversions of some personal property. For example, a barge and a tug do

not satisfy the similar property standard under the involuntary conversion rule, but do
generally meet the like kind standard. See id. §§ 1.1033(a)-2(c)(9)(iii), 1.1031(a)2(b)(2)(xii), Rev. Proc. 87-56, 1987-2 C.B. 674, as modified and clarifiedby Rev. Proe.

88-22, 1988-1 C.B. 785.
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deferred, three-cornered exchanges." Consequently, it is arguable that the two
taxpayers in the example should be perceived as similarly situated and that the
use of a stricter standard for granting nonrecognition treatment to the involuntary
converter violates horizontal equity by treating similarly situated taxpayers in a
dissimilar manner.9"
Indeed, in a limited context, Congress seems to have recognized that the
rationales for the like kind and involuntarily conversion rules do not demand
different standards and that using the same standard for voluntary and
involuntary dispositions is more equitable. As noted earlier, Section 1033(g),
added in 1958, treats like kind property as satisfying the similar property
standard on condemnations ofbusiness or investment real estate. In enacting this
provision, Congress acknowledged that there is no reason why the same standard
should not be used to determine what constitutes a continuity of investment for
both voluntary exchanges and condemnations of business or investment real
estate.9 9 Congress also stated that it is particularly unfortunate that the law at
that time had applied a more narrow standard to dispositions that were beyond
the taxpayer's control,"'0 thus, apparently recognizing the horizontal inequities
that may arise from a dual approach for nonrecognition treatment.t0'
Nonetheless, Congress only adopted the use of a single standard in the context
of voluntary exchanges and condemnations of business or investment real estate,
despite the fact that its stated rationale for doing so suggests that the same
standard be used for all involuntary conversions and voluntary dispositions.1 2

97.

See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 12, at 301.

Furthermore, as discussed infra Part V.B, this Article recommends that the like kind rule
employ an express rollover mechanism, like that used for involuntary conversions.
98. See Endelman, supranote 15, at 594 (arguing that the same test that is applied
to voluntary exchanges, also should be applied to involuntary conversions ofall property
(notjust condemnations ofbusiness orinvestment real estate) in orderto "achieve amore
equitable distribution of nonrecognition of gain").
99. See S. REP. No. 1983, 1958-2 C.B. 993.
100. See id.
101. See Endelman, supra note 15, at 594 (viewing Congress' enactment ofSection
1033(g) as an acknowledgment of the inequity that results from applying a stricter
standard for nonrecognition treatment to involuntary conversions as compared to
voluntary exchanges).
102. Perhaps Congress felt that it was not important to equate the two standards
outside of the context of condemnations of business or investmentreal estate, given that
most involuntary conversions probably involve such situations. Cf Bruce N. Edwards,
Involuntary Conversions, 568-3d TAX MGMT. A-30 (noting that most Section 1033
applications involve condemnations of business or investment real property). There
appears to be no reason for not applying a single standard to other types of conversions,
however, even if they occur less frequently than real property conversions, and, as
discussed below, administrative considerations favor the use of a single standard for all
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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As the preceding analysis indicates, efficiency and horizontal equity
concerns do not appear to require different replacement property standards, and
a single standard may even have more support. Furthermore, with tax
administration concerns in mind, it is reasonably clear that a single standard is
the better approach. The use of a single standard should result in less of an
administrative burden on the IRS and Treasury, given that the government would
have only one standard to apply and would also no longer need to issue
administrative pronouncements for the deleted standard. With one standard,
there might also be less of a burden for the courts, because there should be fewer
legal issues to decide. Taxpayers (and their advisors) should also benefit from
the elimination of one of the standards, as there would be less law of which to
be knowledgeable, and the law on the single standard may be better thought out
and less uncertain, given that government officials may have more time to devote
to this single standard as opposed to dividing their efforts in administering two
standards.
As noted earlier, the Joint Committee on Taxation, in its recently published
simplification study, has similarly recognized the complexity added to the tax
system by multiple rules with similar objectives. 3 In this regard, the Joint
Committee has recommended several changes aimed at ridding the system of
duplicative provisions, such as adopting a uniform definition of qualifying child
for purposes of determining eligibility under the dependency exemption and the
earned income credit, among other provisions," as well as a uniform definition
of family for purposes of applying the various attribution rules contained in the
Code."°S Clearly, a stronger case for simplification exists with respect to having
a uniform definition of qualifying child as compared to using a single standard
for determining eligible replacement property, given that the multiple definitions
that exist under current law are a major source of taxpayer confusion and
errors."t° Yet, the simplification case for eliminating one of the two standards
for determining eligible replacement property is more than just plausible, and
similar to the case for adopting a uniform definition of family for attribution

property covered under Sections 1033 and 1031.
In 1989, Congress came close to adopting a single standard for all types of property
covered under the like kind and involuntary conversion rules when the House passed a
bill that would have applied the similar property standard to exchanges under Section
1031. H.R. 3299, 101st Cong. § 11601(a). This part of the House bill was dropped by
the Conference Committee and, thus, was not enacted into law. H. R. REP. No. 101-614
(1990).
103. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 36, at 7.
104. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 12, at 52.
105. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 12, at 153.
106. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 12, at 50-51.
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purposes. 7 Consequently, while the use of a single standard would not be a
major blow for simplification, it would at least be a step in the right direction.

2. The Appropriate Standard
The decision to use the same standard to determine eligible replacement
property under both the like kind and involuntary conversion rules raises the
issue of what standard to use. In this regard, several design options are
available. First, a decision needs to be made as to the general approach used in
determining eligible replacement property-the two main options being a
categorization approach similar to that used under the like kind standard' 3 or a
facts and circumstances approach like that employed under the similar property
standard. 10 9 Second, once a general approach is selected, the details of the
approach must be prescribed: in particular, the specific asset groupings used
under a categorization approach, or the factors considered and degree of
similarity required under a facts and circumstances approach. This section
proceeds by first deciding between the like kind standard or the similar property
standard as the general approach to be used in light of fundamental tax policies,
and then determines whether modifications to the selected approach are needed
in order to further advance these policies.
a. Like Kind or Similar Property
From the standpoint of administrability, the like kind standard appears to
provide the greater amount of certainty, and, thus, appears to be the simpler one
for taxpayers, practitioners, and the IRS to apply. With regard to dispositions of
real property, there is seldom an issue of whether the replacement property
qualifies as like kind, given that almost all real property is treated as like kind.110
In addition, for dispositions of depreciable tangible personal property, most like
kind determinations are relatively straightforward as a result of the like class
approach employed in the Section 1031 regulations, under which depreciable

107. See STAFF OF THEJOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 12, at 254 (pointing
out that a uniform definition of family for attribution purposes would achieve some
simplification in that taxpayers, practitioners, and the IRS would have a single definition
to apply).
108. See infra notes 110-17 and accompanying text.
109. See infra notes 118-22 and accompanying text.
110. SeeTreas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-i (b) (2001). As an exception, the statute provides
that U.S. and foreign real property are not of like kind. I.R.C. § 1031 (h)(1) (2000). In
addition, the IRS has ruled that unimproved land and improvements made to land already
owned by that taxpayer are not of like kind. See Rev. Rul. 71-41, 1971-1 C.B. 223.
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tangible personal properties are treated as like kind if they are either within the
same "General Asset Class" or "Product Class.""' For this purpose, the
regulations incorporate the asset and product classifications issued by the federal
government for depreciation and industrial purposes, respectively." 2 Thus, for
example, a personal computer and a printer are of like kind because they are in
the same asset class," 3 whereas an airplane and a heavy general purpose truck
are not of like kind because they are in different asset classes. 14 While a less
definite approach is applied with respect to intangible personal property, even
here the regulations use a somewhat structured approach that looks at both the
rights involved (e.g., copyright or patent) and the underlying property to which
the intangible relates." 5 For example, the regulations provide that a copyright
on one novel is of like kind to a copyright on a different novel, whereas a
copyright on a song is not of like kind to a copyright on a novel." 6 Finally, the
regulations employ an easy to apply approach for goodwill and going concern
value, providing that the goodwill or going concern value of one business is
never of like kind to that of another business. 17
In contrast, the similar property standard that is generally used for
involuntary conversions requires a fact-intensive and somewhat subjective
analysis of the particular characteristics of the relinquished and replacement
properties. Consequently, this test results in more uncertainty and, thus, greater
administrative burdens for the government and taxpayers in terms of compliance,
controversy, and predictability. To elaborate, where the taxpayer used (as
opposed to leased) the converted property, the so-called "owner user" prong of
the similarproperty test requires that the relinquished and replacement properties

111. See Treas Reg. § 1.1031(a)-2 (2001).
112. See id.
113. See id. § 1.1031(a)-2(b)(7).
114. Id. Technically, properties that are in different asset or product classes can
still be treated as like kind property if they are otherwise considered to be of like kind;
however, it appears very unlikely that this would occur, given that the test that would
apply for this purpose would likely be similar to the rather narrow standard used under
the involuntary conversion rule. Cf Howard J. Levine, New PersonalProperty and
Multi-Asset Exchange Regs. May Increase Taxable Gain, 73 J. TAX'N 16 (1990)
(pointing out that prior to the issuance of the like class rules, it was thought that the like
kind standard for depreciable tangible personal property was similar to the "similar in
service or use" test used for involuntary conversions). Of course, if, as this Article
subsequently recommends, the similar property test is eliminated, only the like class
component of the standard for tangible personal property would remain.
115. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-2(c)(l) (2001).
116. See id. § 1.1031(a)-2(c)(3).
117. Id.§ 1.1031(a)-2(c)(2).
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have closely similar physical characteristics and end uses, ' thus, necessitating
a comparison of these attributes. Where the taxpayer leased the converted
property to another, the "owner investor" prong of the standard compares, with
respect to the relinquished and replacement properties, the taxpayer's
management activities, services rendered to the tenants, and business risks." 9
Like any fact-intensive analysis, the risk of inconsistent outcomes is high. For
example, according to the authorities, the owner-user test is satisfied where
2°
but not
prune, apricot, and walnut orchards replace a truck and cattle farm
2
where billiard facilities replace bowling facilities.1 ' While in both situations the
relinquished and replacement properties were involved in the same general, but
not specific, type of business (fanning in the one and recreation in the other), the
results under the similar property standard differ."z
The promulgation of the personal property rules under the like kind
regulations underscores the administrative advantages of the like kind standard
as compared to the similar property standard. Before the adoption of these
regulations, the like kind standard as applied to personal property was quite
murky, with most ofthe guidance focusing on esoteric items rather than the more
mundane types of personal property.I 3 In many cases, taxpayers and the IRS
were left to grapple with the amorphous general standards provided in the
regulations.2 The prior like kind standard regarding personal property closely
resembled the similar property standardbecause of this general lack of guidance,
as well as the limited guidance that suggested using a fact-intensive approach.,'

118. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 76-319, 1976-2 C.B. 242.
119. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 64-237, 1964-2 C.B. 319.
120. See Stevenson v. United States, 64-2 USTC 9821 (N.D. Cal. 1964).
121. See Rev. Rul. 76-319, 1976-2 C.B. 242.
122. The degree of uncertainty under the similar property standard versus the like
kind standard may be further indicated by the number of cases and rulings addressing the
application ofthese standards. RIA, United States Tax Reporter, Income Tax, lists twice
as many cases and IRS rulings that involve applications of the similar property standard
as compared to the like kind standard. CompareRESEARCH INSTITUTE OF AMERICA, 11
UNITED STATES TAX REPORTER, INCOMETAX, 10,335.22 with 10,315.02. Given that
a voluntary disposition appears to be more common than an involuntary one, it would
appear that the higher degree of uncertainty associated with the similar property standard
is responsible for the apparently greater number of cases and rulings that address the
application of the similar property standard.
123. See John A. Bogdanski, On Beyond Real Estate: The New Like-Kind
Exchange Regulations, 48 TAX NOTES 903, 904-05 (1990).
124. SeeTreas.Reg.§ 1.1031(a)-l(b) (2001)("thewords'likekind'havereference
to the nature or character of the property and not its grade or quality").
125. Cf.Rev. Rul. 82-166,1982-2 C.B. 190 (IRS ruling that gold bullion and silver
bullion held for investment are not of like kind because they are "intrinsically different
metals and primarily are used in different ways").
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002

27

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 4 [2002], Art. 1
MISSOURI LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 67

In a move lauded by commentators as a blow for certainty, the Treasury
promulgated regulations specifically dealing with the like kind status of personal
property, which, as noted earlier, employ a relatively easy to apply asset
classification approach for depreciable tangible personal property. 26 The
decision to adopt the personal property regulations recognizes the administrative
value of having a well-defined, categorization method for determining eligible
replacement property as opposed to an amorphous, facts and circumstances
approach.' 27
In addition, the like kind standard may have administrative advantages over
the similar property standard with regard to transactions involving multiple
properties, for example, where the assets of one business are disposed of and the
assets of another business serve as replacement property. The regulations
employ a fragmented approach for evaluating replacement property under the
like kind standard, under which the separate properties disposed of and acquired

126. See Bogdanski, supra note 123, at 907. Despite their administrative
advantages, the like kind personal property regulations have been criticized on other
policy grounds; that is, using depreciation and industrial classifications to determine like
kind status may not be appropriate given the different purposes involved in establishing
these classifications. See id. The property groupings for depreciation, industrial, and like
kind purposes do share an important common feature, however, in that each of the
groupings contains similar types ofproperty. Moreover, the use ofthese similar property
classifications for purposes of Section 1031 supports a view espoused by this
Article-that the policy underlying the like kind rule calls for no more precise a standard
than one requiring that the relinquished and replacement properties be not significantly
different, and that the specifics of the standard should be determined based on tax
administration concerns.
127. The like kind standard's administrative advantages over the similar property
standard can also be likened to the administrative advantages of the current rules for
determining depreciation periods as compared to prior law. Prior to the enactment of the
asset depreciation system, a property's useful life for computing depreciation deductions
was generally determined under a facts and circumstances approach that was quite
uncertain and led to controversies between taxpayers and the IRS. See STAFF OF JOINT
COMM. ON TAXATION, PROPOSED DEPRECIATION AND INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT
REvisIoNs, 3-12 (Comm. Print 1981), reprintedin, STANLEY S. SURREY ETAL., FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 467 (Successor ed. 1986). With the

enactment of the asset depreciation range system, Congress provided the IRS with the
authority to publish class lives for various property types (see I.R.C. § 167(m) (2000)),
thus promoting certainty and reducing the amount of controversy with regard to the
determination of depreciation periods. See id.at 470. This approach was continued with
the enactment of ACRS, which bases recovery periods on the class lives published
pursuant to the asset depreciation range system. See I.R.C. § 168(c), (e) (2000).
Similarly, the use of the like standard, as opposed to the similar property standard,
promotes certainty and reduces controversy given its categorization approach for
determining eligible replacement property.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss4/1
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in a multiple asset transaction are individually determined to be of like kind. 128
While the regulations use a very intricate approach in applying the like kind rule
to multiple asset transactions, 129 they do provide definite rules that build on the
objective like kind standards used for real property and most personal property,
and, thus, appear to have the benefit of certainty. In contrast, it is somewhat
unclear how the similar property standard applies to an involuntary conversion
of multiple assets. While the IRS has indicated that an asset-by-asset approach
should be used,130 the courts have employed an aggregate approach in evaluating
the conversion of an entire business under the similar property standard.',
Although it is possible to apply a fragmented approach in evaluating the
conversion of a business, there would seem to be some inconsistency in using
such an approach given that the owner-user test is partly concerned with the
functions of the relinquished and replacement properties, which might be more
appropriately determined by examining a business as a whole. An aggregate
approach, however, may pose serious administrative difficulties due to the need
to weigh in the overall evaluation the effect of some clear differences in the
business' asset composition, and because of the high tax stakes involved in the
inquiry: that is, the recognition of the entire amount of realized gain on the
business properties if the similar property standard is determined not to be
satisfied. Moreover, even if a fragmented approach were to be used under the
similar property standard, there is a good deal of uncertainty regarding its exact
application; unlike the detailed rules for multiple asset transactions under the like
kind regulations, there are no rules that provide an exact methodology for
dealing with multiple asset conversions. Consequently, the greater certainty
provided by the use of a fragmented approach, and the definite rules for multiple

128. See Treas Reg. § 1.1031(j)-l (2001).
129. Specifically, the regulations separate the relinquished and replacement
properties that are determined to be of like kind into "exchange groups," with each
grouping of like kind assets constituting a separate exchange group. The amount of
recognized gain for each exchange group is then determined on an aggregate basis and
is equal to the lesser of the realized gain on the transaction for that group or the
"exchange group deficiency," which is essentially defined as the excess of the total fair
market value of the properties relinquished in an exchange group over the total fair
market value of the properties received in that exchange group. See Treas. Reg. §
1.1031(j)-1(b)(2)(iv) (2001). There are additional rules for dealing with situations where
boot or liabilities are transferred or received in the transaction.
130. See Rev. Rul. 70-465, 1970-2 C.B. 162. The IRS has also, however, appeared
to use an aggregate approach. See Rev. Rul. 76-319, 1972-2 C.B. 242 (billiards center
with a bar and lounge ruled not similar in its entirety to bowling center with a bar and
lounge).
131. See, e.g., Massillon-Cleveland-Akron Sign Co. v. Commissioner, 15 T.C. 79
(1950).
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asset transactions, appear to be additional administrative reasons for preferring
the like kind standard over the similar property test.
Regarding efficiency and equity, these policy concerns (that are assumed
to support the provisions) do not appear to provide any real guidance on the
details of the standard, other than calling for a standard that permits
nonrecognition treatment for situations where a taxpayer experiences an
insignificant change in position.'
With respect to personal property, either
standard appears to satisfy this "insignificant change in position" touchstone.
While the similar property standard may be more narrow because it generally
requires a close similarity between the relinquished and replacement
properties, 33 the asset groupings employed under the like kind standard do
involve assets with a reasonable degree of similarity.13 4 For real property
dispositions, however, only the similar property standard may limit
nonrecognition treatment to transactions resulting in an insignificant change in
position, given that almost all real property is of like kind under the Section 1031
standard. 35
Despite the efficiency and equity issues raised by the broad like kind test
for real property, this Article recommends that the like kind standard be used as
the general approach for determining the eligibility of replacement property
under both the like kind and involuntary conversion rules. For personal
property, either standard appears to require the requisite quantum of resemblance
between the relinquished and replacement properties; yet, the objective,
categorization approach employed under the like kind standard has clear
administrative advantages over the amorphous, facts and circumstances test used
under the similar property standard. Further, modifications to the like kind
standard for real property could be made so that nonrecognition treatment is
granted to only those transactions that can reasonably be viewed as resulting in
an insignificant change in a taxpayer's position, although this will require a
balancing of the administrative costs involved. The next subsection examines
this issue.

132. See supra notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
133. See supranotes 118-22 and accompanying text; see also supranote 96 (barge
and tug not similar property, but generally are of like kind).
134. Among the asset groupings under the like kind regulations are the following
categories: office furniture, fixtures, and equipment; computers and peripheral
equipment; automobiles and taxis; buses; light general purpose trucks; and heavy general
purpose trucks. See Treas. Reg. 1.1031(a)(2)-2(b)(2) (2001).
135. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
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b. Modifying the Like Kind Standard
Much criticism has been leveled against the broad standard applicable to
real estate under the like kind rule, which treats almost all real property as like
kind. 136 Indeed, in 1989, Congress considered, butdidnotadopt, aprovisionthat
would have replaced the like kind standard with the narrower similar property
standard in order to limit the situations where real property transactions qualify
37
for nonrecognition treatment. 1
From the standpoint of efficiency, the broad like kind test for real property
may not be justifiable given that exchanges of dissimilar real property may not
involve the degree of tax elasticity that arguably warrants nonrecognition
treatment. 38 Furthermore, more liberal nonrecognition treatment for real
property, as compared to personal property (for which the like kind standard is
narrower), 139 may create a tax incentive for investing in real property over
personal property, possibly resulting in additional efficiency costs at Time
One."4 The efficiency consequences of a broad like kind standard for real
property are far from certain, however. First, it is not clear that having a more
stringent like kind test for real property would promote efficiency. While an
exchange of similar real properties may be more tax-elastic, a dissimilar realty
exchange may be tax-elastic enough to warrant nonrecognition treatment; there
appears to be a lack of empirical data on tax elasticities to support either a broad
or narrow standard for real property.'
Second, whether a broader like kind
standard for real property vis-A-vis personal property provides a tax incentive for
investing in real property is complicated by other differences in the tax treatment
of real and personal property. Real property is subject to more favorable
treatment under the at-risk'4 2 and passive loss 143 rules, and it is generally

136. See e.g., Shaviro, supra note 17, at 44; Komhauser, supra note 2, at 449;
800
(Successor ed. 1986); Jensen, supranote 10, at 207.
137. See H. R. REP. No. 101-247, at 1339-42 (1989). The Clinton Administration
made an identical proposal in 1997. See Joseph G. Howe, III, Inside Washington:
Beware of Tax Simplification, REAL EST. TAX DIG. 183, 208 (June 1997).
138. See Shaviro, supranote 17, at 44. See supranotes 49-59 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the efficiency case for the like kind rule.
139. See supra notes 110-17 and accompanying text.
140. See supranotes 54-56 and accompanying text for a discussion of Time One
efficiency effects.
141. See supranotes 90-91 and accompanying text.
142. See I.R.C. § 465(b)(6) (2000) (allowing at risk amounts for certain nonrecourse debt incurred in connection with the activity of holding real property).
143. See id. § 469(c) (providing special treatment to rental real estate activities of
certain taxpayers engaged in real property businesses).
STANLEY S. SURREY ET. AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: CASES AND MATERIALS
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acknowledged that personal residences receive generous treatment under the
Code in order to encourage home ownership; 1" personal property, however,
probably receives greater benefits under the accelerated depreciation rules. 45
Consequently, in light of these other disparities in tax treatment, it is not clear
whether more liberal like kind treatment for real property exchanges creates an
overall tax incentive for investing in real estate as opposed to personal property.
Nonetheless, although lacking in certainty, reasonable assumptions about
tax elasticities suggest that the current like kind standard for realty is too
broad." Reasonable assumptions should have some value in the absence of
empirical data, given that decisions regarding nonrecognition rules (such as
47
whether to have them and what features they should contain) must be made.
Further, anecdotal evidence tends to confirm that taxpayers often use like kind
exchanges of real estate as a substitute for taxable sales rather than for retaining
the property. 41 Similarly, the application of the broad like kind standard for
realty to involuntary conversions appears to be questionable on perceptional
horizontal equity grounds; where a taxpayer goes from holding one piece of real
estate (e.g., unimproved rural land) to a piece of dissimilar realty (e.g., a city
apartment building), the situation looks more like a change of investments than
the continued holding of the same property.
Thus, there appear to be fairly strong efficiency and equity arguments for
tightening the like kind test for real property. Such a move is bound to create

144. See, e.g., GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 13, at 347, 654 (noting this as the
stated policy goal, for the home mortgage interest deduction; pointing out that the
exclusion and deductions relating to personal residences amount to a significant tax
expenditure). This includes the exclusion of gain under Section 121 on the disposition
of a principal residence, the deductibility of mortgage interest expense under Section
163(h), and the fact that the imputed income on owner-occupied housing is not subject
to tax. The tax benefits associated with home ownership may at first seem irrelevant to
the efficiency consequences of allowing a broad like kind test for real property, because
personal residences are not eligible for like kind treatment as result of the holding
requirement. See I.R.C. § 1031 (a)(1) (2001). It may not be very difficult, however, to

convert a personal residence to investment property in order to take advantage of the like
kind rules. Moreover, as discussed subsequently, this Article recommends the
elimination of the holding requirement. See Part V.D.4 for a thorough discussion of
these points.
145.
TAXATION

Cf JAMES J. FREELAND ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL INCOME

439, 441-42 (12th ed. 2002) (noting that the Tax Reform Act of 1986
generally allowed more generous depreciation on personal property, while extending the
recovery period and mandating the use of the straight-line depreciation method for real
property).
146. See Shaviro, supra note 17, at 44, 65.
147. See Shaviro, supra note 17, at 65.
148. See Shaviro, supra note 17, at 44.
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additional complexity, however, and, therefore, the administrative consequences
need to be considered. For reasons expressed earlier, 49 administrative
considerations counsel against using a similar property-like approach for realty
that would require a fact-intensive analysis of the physical characteristics, uses,
and possibly locations of the relinquished and replacement real estate. 50 A more
acceptable standard would be one that employs a categorization approach like
that used under the like kind standard for personal property.' 5' Of course, such
a categorization approach could take several forms. One possibility would be
to use a categorization approach that is modeled on the classifications of real
property for depreciation purposes; that is, all real property (including the land
on which improvements are placed) would fall into one of several categoriesresidential rental property,'52 nonresidential real property, several categories
of specialized realty,'"4 land improvements,'-' and unimproved real property. A
more refined and narrow approach would be to divide real property among many
categories, such as office buildings, apartment houses, hotels, theaters, oil wells,
and vacant land just to name some of the possible categories.'56 In either case,
it would be advisable for Congress to provide the IRS and Treasury with the
authority to publish a detailed description of the categories, as is done for
purposes of the depreciation rules and the personal property like kind
regulations, rather than having taxpayers and the IRS grapple over language in
committee reports that either suggests possible categories or provides some
examples of situations qualifying for nonrecognition treatment.'1

149. See supranotes 118-27 and accompanying text.
150. Cf. Rev. Rul. 70-399, 1970-2 C.B. 164 (relinquished and replacement hotels
not similar where taxpayer operated one and leased the other).
151. See supra notes 111-17 and accompanying text.
152. See I.R.C. § 168(e)(2)(A) (2000).
153. See id. § 168(e)(2)(B).
154. Among the categories ofspecializedrealty could be categories for agricultural
and horticultural structures, other farm buildings, most theme and amusement park
structures, and railroad gradings or tunnel bores. Cf. id. § 168(e), (i); Rev. Proc. 87-56,
1987-2 C.B. 674 (specifying such categories for depreciation purposes).
155. As is the case for depreciation purposes, this could be a single category that
contains sidewalks, roads, canals, waterways, drainage facilities, sewers, wharves and
docks, bridges, fences, and radio and transmitting towers, among other items. See Rev.
Proc. 87-56,1987-2 C.B. 674. Altematively, ifitisnottoo administrativelyburdensome,
this could be divided into multiple categories.
156. In its explanation of a 1989 proposal to replace the like kind standard with the
similar property standard, the House Report appears to suggest such a categorization
approach, rather than a "pure" similar property standard, for applying Section 1031 to
real property exchanges. See H.R. REP. No. 101-247, at 1340-41 (1989), reprinted in
1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1906, 2810-11.
157. In this regard, the House Report's explanation of the 1989 proposal to replace
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A categorization approach for real property, however, would not necessarily
be without administrative difficulties. Issues may arise as to which category
applies, especially with respect to real property with more than one use;
obviously, the more categories that there are, the greater the number of such
issues that would arise. Administratively, an approach modeled on the current
classifications for depreciating real property is the better choice. Under this
approach, it should be clear as to the appropriate category in the vast majority of
cases given that the classifications are defined by objective criteria. As an
example, residential rental property is defined as any building or structure if for
the relevant taxable year eighty percent or more of the gross rental income from
the realty is rental income from dwelling units. 58
' Moreover, under this approach
a substantial portion of real property should fall within the nonresidential real
property category, as this category includes buildings or structures, other than
residential rental property, with a class life of least 27.5 years. Therefore, in
many situations the particular use of the real property would be irrelevant; for
example, regardless of whether a structure houses a bowling alley, a restaurant,
59
or offices, it would be treated as nonresidential real property.'

the like kind standard with the similar property standard merely states that an exchange
of improved properties of different uses generally would not qualify for nonrecognition
treatment, and provides a few examples, without giving the IRS the authority to issue a
comprehensive list of categories. See id.
158. See I.R.C. § 168(e)(2)(A) (2000). Excluded from this category are hotels,
motels, and other buildings more than half of the dwelling units in which are used on a
transient basis. See id.
159. With such a categorization approach for real property, it may be necessary to
develop anti-abuse rules to deal with situations where a taxpayer constructs relatively
minor improvements on previously unimproved real property in order to have the
property fall within one ofthe improved realty categories, in particular, the nonresidential
real property category. For example, in the absence of anti-abuse rules, under a broad
categorization approach a taxpayer may be able to qualify what is essentially vacant land
as nonresidential real property simply by constructing a small warehouse; the taxpayer
could then dispose of the land and warehouse and acquire a hotel (which would also be
treated as nonresidential real property) in a like kind transaction. While the IRS may be
able to disqualify this transaction from receiving Section 1031 treatment by invoking
common law substance over form principles, it may be better to develop specific antiabuse rules for this situation. A possible approach would be to disregard buildings and
structures for purposes of determining whether property is nonresidential real property
where the fair market value ofthe improvements is below a certain percentage ofthe fair
market value of the land. This rule may also need to be used for the residential rental
property category and possibly other categories as well. Alternatively, a categorization
approach for real property could treat land and improvements therein as separate
properties, and, thus, a disposition of improved realty would be treated as a multiple asset
disposition. See supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text for a discussion ofthe like
kind regulations dealing with multiple asset exchanges. While fragmented treatment of
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss4/1
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Whether and how to modify the like kind standard for real property
involves a balance of competing policies. While a more narrow standard should
promote the underlying policies of efficiency and equity, any narrowing of the
standard would result in increased complexity. The use of a categorization
approach along the lines of the real property depreciation classifications would
appear to strike the appropriate balance. To be sure, the use of this approach,
with a broad default category like nonresidential real property, would still allow
nonrecognition treatment for some transactions that would appear to result in a
significant change in a taxpayer's position, such as the exchange of a hotel for
an office building; 6 ' consequently, to further advance efficiency and equity,
albeit with additional administrative costs, consideration should be given to
carving out of the nonresidential real property category a few (or several) welldefined categories, some examples being hotels and motels, theaters, and
shopping malls. In either case, the use of this standard would prevent like kind
treatment for the transactions with clear nontax significance-for example, an
exchange of vacant land for an apartment building, or an exchange of a farmland
and related structures for a motel. And, while a multi-category standard for real
property would be more intricate and generate more uncertainty than current
law's one category approach, the use of objective, well-defined categories should
result in an administratively acceptable approach, as is the case with the like kind
personal propertyregulations.' 6 For these reasons, this Article recommends that
the like kind standard for real property be narrowed by employing a
categorization approach along the lines of the real property classifications used
for depreciation purposes.'62

land and improvements obviates anti-abuse rules aimed at disregarding minor
improvements to land, such an approach would require that land and improvements be
separately valued for purposes of applying the multiple asset exchange regulations, which
could lead to valuation disputes between taxpayers and the IRS.
160. It is important to point out that while the land and structures in this situation
would be treated as of like kind, any personal property involved in the exchange (the
contents of the building and goodwill) would not necessarily be so treated under the like
kind test for personal property. Thus, assuming the exchange of the real estate involves
related personal property, it is likely that some gain would be required to be recognized
under the multiple property exchangeregulations. SeeTreas. Reg. § 1.1031(j)-(1) (2001)
and notes 128-29 and accompanying text for a discussion of these regulations.
161. As with the use of depreciation and industrial classifications for the personal
property like kind standard, the use of rules similar to the real property depreciation
classifications for the real property like kind standard would provide an additional
administrative benefit: it would allow for the use of one set of rules, or at least similar
rules, for both depreciation and like kind purposes. See supra notes 42, 103-07 and
accompanying text for a discussion ofthe administrative burdens that result from having
duplicative tax rules.
162. As additional modifications, in two respects the like kind standard should be
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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broadened in its application to involuntary conversions. Under current law, a taxpayer
qualifies for nonrecognition treatment upon an involuntary conversion where the
proceeds of the conversion are used to repair property damaged in the conversion, or to
improve or rearrange other property owned by the taxpayer, as long as the improved or
rearranged property is similar to the converted property. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 67-254,
1967-2 CB. 269. There appears to be no reason why nonrecognition treatment should
not continue to be granted in these situations with the use of the like kind standard,
provided that doing so does not present serious administrative difficulties. Without a
technical modification, however, taxpayers may fail to satisfy the like kind standard in
these situations, at least with regard to realty, given that the IRS has ruled that
improvements constructed on previously owned real property are not of like kind to land
and improvements-for purposes of applying Section 1033(g) to involuntary conversions.
See Rev. Rul. 71-41, 197 1-1 C.B. 223. Consequently, it is recommended that taxpayers
be allowed nonrecognition treatment upon an involuntary conversion where they reinvest
the conversion proceeds in previously owned property, provided that after the
reinvestment the property is of like kind to the property that is converted. It should be
noted, however, that the recommended modification to the application of the like kind
standard may not result in the same treatment that is currently accorded under the similar
property standard. Under current law, a taxpayer may receive nonrecognition treatment
under the similar property standard where she uses the conversion proceeds to acquire
new property, or to invest in previously owned property, that, when used in connection
with other previously owned property, renders the integrated properties as similar to the
converted property. The recommended approach would allow nonrecognition treatment
in this situation only if the newly acquired or invested in property is of like kind to the
converted property. To do otherwise would require an administratively difficult facts
and circumstances approach that compares the functions of the integrated properties to
that of the converted property.
The limited coverage of the like kind rule necessitates another modification to the
like kind standard as it applies to involuntary conversions. As noted earlier, the like kind
rule is inapplicable to the disposition of financial assets such as stocks, bonds, notes, and
partnership interests. See I.R.C. § 1031(a)(2) (2000). Instead, several other Code
provisions provide nonrecognition treatment for certain voluntary exchanges involving
financial assets. See, e.g., id. § 1037 (certain exchanges of United States obligations),
id. § 354 (exchanges of stock and securities in connection with a reorganization), id. §
1036 (exchanges of stock in the same corporation). As a consequence, there are no like
kind tests pertaining to such financial assets. The involuntary conversion rule, however,
does not have any exceptions for financial assets, and occasionally these items are
involuntarily converted. See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 82-33-144 (May 24, 1982) (dealing
with the condemnation of stock in a private utility). Therefore, it is recommended that
the similar property standard be kept alive as a supplement to the like kind standard for
situations involving the involuntary conversion of financial assets. While this would
require a fact-intensive analysis to determine the eligibility of replacement property in
these situations, involuntary conversions of financial assets appear to be relatively rare,
and, thus, the administrative burdens should not be large.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss4/1
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B. The Exchange Requirement Under the Like Kind Rule
Under the like kind rule, only an exchange of like kind properties can
qualify for nonrecognition treatment. The exchange requirement under current
law, however, is a mere formality; the like kind rule really employs an effective
rollover mechanism, given that the regulations, 63 through a series ofcomplicated
rules, effectively permit taxpayers to sell one property for cash and use the
proceeds to purchase a second property.1 " Moreover, an exchange requirement,
whether real or formal, is not a necessary ingredient for a nonrecognition
provision; the involuntary conversion rule,'
along with a few other
nonrecognition provisions,'" do not require an exchange and instead expressly
allow taxpayers to dispose of property for cash and use the proceeds to acquire
qualifying property. There would appear then to be three possibilities for linking
the disposition and acquisition ofproperties under the like kind rule: (i) a real or
simultaneous exchange requirement, (ii) an effective rollover mechanism, and
(iii) an express rollover mechanism. This section seeks to determine which of
these approaches is best supported by fundamental tax policies.
The efficiency rationale for the like kind rule suggests that there should be
adequate linkage between the disposition of the relinquished property and the
acquisition of the replacement property. According to the efficiency rationale,
nonrecognition is accorded like kind transactions so that taxpayers will not
refrain from engaging in dispositions and related acquisitions that are relatively
tax-elastic. Thus, the efficiency basis suggests that nonrecognition should only
apply where the disposition and the acquisition are factually linked. Looking for
actual linkage, however, would necessitate an inquiry into a taxpayer's
subjective intent, an administratively burdensome task. Instead, a surrogate for
actual linkage can be a requirement that the relinquished property be
simultaneously exchanged for the replacement property. Another surrogate can
be a rollover rule that requires that the replacement property be acquired within
a reasonable period preceding or following the disposition of the relinquished
property. 67 Either measure appears to be consistent with the efficiency basis for

163. Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(k)-I (2001).
164. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supranote 12, at 301.
165. Given that taxpayers receive cash proceeds in most involuntary conversions,
an exchange requirement would render the provision of little use.
166. See I.R.C. § 1044 (2000) (allowing rollover ofpublicly traded securities gain
into specialized small business investment companies); id. § 1045 (allowing rollover of
gain from qualified small business stock to another qualified small business stock). In
addition, former Section 1034 allowed rollover of gain on a sale of a principal residence.
Id. § 1034 (repealed 1997).
167. Part V.C, infra, examines the considerations involved in setting the length of
replacement periods under the like kind and involuntary conversion rules.
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the like kind rule, given that they both allow for a reasonable inference of actual
linkage.
The efficiency rationale, however, does not indicate with reasonable
certainty which of these measures is more beneficial. On the one hand, the Time
Two efficiency benefits that result from the application of the like kind rule are
as likely to occur with a planned sale and re-investment as they are with a
simultaneous exchange of properties. That is, if, because of tax elasticity, an
exchange of one property for another would be deterred, a related sale and
reinvestment involving the same properties would similarly be deterred. A
simultaneous exchange requirement would ensure that a disposition and
acquisition are factually related, and, thus, prevents nonrecognition treatment for
dispositions that are relatively tax-inelastic, but happen to be followed by
unrelated acquisitions that give the overall appearance of a tax-elastic
transaction: for example, where a taxpayer sells unimproved real property for
the purpose of consuming the proceeds but subsequently changes her mind and
acquires a different tract of unimproved realty. A simultaneous exchange
requirement, however, is clearly underinclusive in detecting the factual
connection between dispositions and acquisitions-in many cases not involving
exchanges, dispositions are made with the intent of making a specific
acquisition. Moreover, while some taxpayers would structure related
dispositions and acquisitions as three-cornered exchanges in order to satisfy a
simultaneous exchange requirement, 68 the associated transaction costs may deter
other taxpayers from disposing ofproperty, thereby resulting in lower Time Two
efficiency benefits with a like kind rule that contains a simultaneous exchange
requirement. It would appear then that a rollover mechanism, either express or
effective, rather than a simultaneous exchange requirement, would more
accurately target related dispositions and acquisitions, provided that the time
period for replacing relinquished property is reasonably limited.'69 On the other
hand, the use of a rollover mechanism increases the Time Two efficiency costs
by increasing the number of like kind transactions occurring solely for tax
reasons. 70 That is, because a rollover mechanism provides a great amount of
flexibility in acquiring new property whereas a simultaneous exchange
requirement tends to limit re-investment options, the use of either an express or
effective rollover mechanism should result in more situations where taxpayers
enter into like kind transactions as a substitute for what would otherwise be cash
sales on non-like exchanges.

168. See infra notes 181-85 and accompanying text.
169. Cf. Willis, supra note 11, at 92-93 (arguing for rollover in lieu of the

exchange requirement based on effectuating the continuity of investment policy that
underlies Section 1031); Jensen, supranote 10, at 207 (same).
170. See Shaviro, supra note 17, at 44.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss4/1

38

Brown: Brown: Proposal to Reform the Like Kind and Involuntary Conversion Rules in Light
2002]
REFORMING CERTAINNONRECOGNITIONRULES
743
In sum, while the use of an express or effective rollover mechanism, rather
than a simultaneous exchange requirement, likely results in Time Two benefip
by more accurately providing nonrecognition to related dispositions and
acquisitions that would otherwise be deterred by current taxation, it also should
result in increased Time Two costs by causing taxpayers to make re-investments
that are motivated purely by tax considerations. Deciding whether to use an
effective rollover mechanism versus an express rollover mechanism also
involves an evaluation of efficiency tradeoffs; the greater transaction costs
associated with a like kind rule employing an effective rollover mechanism
would likely result in both lower Time Two benefits, because some tax-elastic
transactions would be deterred, as well as lower Time Two costs, because some
tax motivated transactions would be curbed. Given the apparent dearth of
information on tax elasticities and welfare losses,"' the overall efficiency effects
of these alternatives are uncertain.
With the uncertainty of efficiency analysis, tax administration concerns
should be of prime importance in deciding among the possible approaches for
linking dispositions and acquisitions under the like kind rule. In this regard, the
effective rollover mechanism employed in the deferred exchange regulations
appears to be the worst of the available options. These regulations require
taxpayers to comply with a series of complicated rules in order to maintain the
form of an "exchange" for transactions that effectively amount to a sale of one
property and acquisition of another. To elaborate, the regulations allow a
taxpayer to transfer property to a "qualified intermediary," who then can sell the
property for cash, acquire like kind property at the taxpayer's direction, and
transfer the like kind property to the taxpayer. 7 2 Alternatively, a taxpayer could
transfer the property to the buyer, who then purchases like kind property that the
taxpayer designates and transfers the property to the taxpayer. Because any
money or other property received by a taxpayer's agent is attributed to the
taxpayer, the regulations contain detailed rules distinguishing a qualified
intermediary from an agent.7 3 The regulations also contain intricate rules that
provide safe harbors so that taxpayers can avoid being treated as actually or
constructively receiving money as a result of arrangements securing the buyer's
performance. 74 A recently released revenue procedure provides an additional
set of complex requirements that, if satisfied, allow taxpayers to acquire the
replacement property prior to the disposition of the relinquishedproperty. 175 The

171. See supranotes 58, 90-91 and accompanying text.
172. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(k)-I (2001).
173. See id. § 1.1031(k)-l(g)(4)(iii).
174. See id. § 1.1031(k)-l(g)(1). Included among the safe.harbors are security or
guarantee arrangements and qualified escrow accounts and trusts. See id.
175. See Rev. Proc. 2000-37, 2000-40 I.R.B. 308.
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rules are quite intricate, thereby placing substantial burdens on taxpayers and
their advisers in understanding them, and on the IRS in administering them.
They also present uncertainties; for example, there appear to be several
unanswered questions concerning a taxpayer's access to escrowed funds, 76 and,
indeed, one commentator points out that many deferred exchanges will raise
issues that are not directly addressed in the regulations. 77 Furthermore, as a
result of the rules' complexity, taxpayers incur additional transaction costs for
tax advice and facilitator services. 78 Because the effect of the deferred exchange
regulations is to allow rollover treatment, it seems easy to dismiss these rules as
purposeless formalism and complexity-similar substance could be achieved
through a simple, express rollover rule. 79 For this reason, the staff of the Joint
Committee on Taxation recommends that the exchange requirement, as well as
the deferred exchange regulations, be replaced with an express rollover rule. 80
Requiring simultaneous exchanges, another possible approach, would also
lead to significant complexity. With such a requirement, it is inevitable that
taxpayers would still structure multiparty exchanges. Indeed, this was the case
before the courts and Congress allowed deferred like kind exchanges. For
example, if taxpayer A wants to dispose of her commercial building and acquire
an apartment building, she can enter into an arrangement where she agrees to
transfer the commercial building to buyer B and buyer B agrees to purchase an
apartment building that A has designated and transfer the property to A. Buyer
B then acquires the apartment building and transfers it to taxpayer A in exchange
for A's commercial building, completing a simultaneous like kind exchange.
Thus, a simultaneous exchange requirement would still engender tax planning
and its attendant costs.'' Furthermore, there would be uncertainty and
176. See James R. Hamill, Avoiding Traps in DeferredLike-Kind Exchanges, TAX
ADVISER, Nov. 1, 1997, at 716, 718 (noting several open issues).
177. Id.

178. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 12, at 302; see also

Richard M. Lipton, The "State of the Art" in Like-Kind Exchanges, 91 J. TAX'N 78, 79
(1999) (pointing out that the deferred exchange regulations have resulted in the creation
of an entire industry to assist taxpayers in completing nontaxable deferred exchanges).
179. Cf Harroch, supra note 67, at 362-63 (pointing out that deferred, three-way

exchanges are in substance identical to a sale and reinvestment into like kind property).
As mentioned previously, there would likely be some efficiency tradeoffs in using an

express as opposed to effective rollover rule. See supranote 171 and accompanying text.
180. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 12, at 302.
Likewise, House Ways and Means Committee member Amos Houghton recently

introduced a bill that includes a provision allowing for the use of express rollover under
the like kind rule. Individual and Small Business Tax Simplification Act of 2002, H.R.

5505, 107th Cong. (2002).
181. See Harroch, supra note 67, at 363-64 (detailing extra transaction costs

necessitated by a simultaneous exchange requirement).
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controversy as well, as illustrated by the series of court cases dealing with
multiparty, simultaneous exchanges (most involving taxable years ending before
the effective date of the deferred exchange regulations)."'2 The difficulties stem
from the tension involved in many multiparty, simultaneous exchanges: that is,
at some point the situation may more closely resemble a taxable sale and reinvestment rather than a nontaxable simultaneous exchange. Thus, controversies
have arisen over whether a buyer should be treated as a taxpayer's agent,'83 and
whether a taxpayer should be considered in constructive receipt of escrowed
funds."8 With a simultaneous exchange requirement in lieu of current law's
effective rollover mechanism, the uncertainties and controversies that were
prevalent prior to the adoption of the deferred exchange regulations would likely
resurface. While this approach may deter some taxpayers from engaging in
multi-party exchanges, there would likely be a substantial amount of activity in
this area, with resulting uncertainty, controversy, and costly tax planning. 85
By far, the simplest of the three options is to permit express rollover under
the like kind rule. An express rollover mechanism would avoid the intricacy and
uncertainty of the other approaches, as taxpayers wanting to sell property andreinvest the proceeds into like kind property could do so directly without engaging
in complicated multi-party exchanges designed to meet either a deferred or
simultaneous exchange requirement.' 86 This approach should also reduce the

182. See, e.g., Biggs v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 905, 919 (1978), aff'd, 632 F.2d
1171 (Sth Cir. 1980).
183. See, e.g., Rutland v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 40 (1977); Everett v.
Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 274 (1978).
184. See, e.g., Garcia v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 491 (1983), acq., 1984-2 C.B. I
(1984); Klein v. Commissioner, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 1115 (1993).
185. Indeed, even before the allowance of deferred exchanges, the multi-party
exchange area was referred to as the "hottest topic... among small and large scale
investors." See Stanley Weiss & Howard J. Levine, Multi-partyExchanges: Despite
Recent Cases, CarefulAttention to DetailsisNecessary, 7 J. REAL EST. TAX'N 203, 203
(1980).
186. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 12, at 302 (referring to
the reduced complexity that would result from replacing the effectiverollovermechanism
with an express one). It should be pointed out that the Federation of Exchange
Accommodators ("FEA"), a national trade organization that represents qualified
intermediaries, has argued that qualified intermediaries protect government revenues by
performing functions that would otherwise have to be performed by the IRS at the
public's expense. See Lisa Pfenninger, Like Kind Exchanges: Exchange Association
Officer Says GroupShould Oppose Section 1031 Simplification,DAILY TAXREPORT G-3
(October 29, 2002). Even if the need under the current rules for professionals to assist
in like kind exchanges does relieve the IRS of some of its auditing responsibilities, which
appears to be a debatable point, this only means that taxpayers (through the fees charged
for these exchange services), rather than the IRS, bear a portion of the administrative
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amount of tax planning involved with like kind transactions and thereby lower
transaction costs.
With efficiency providing limited guidance, administrability should be the

deciding factor in selecting the approach for linking acquisitions and dispositions
under the like kind rule. Because an express rollover mechanism is clearly
superior in this regard, this Article recommends its use in connection with the
like kind rule.' 87

burden of the effective rollover mechanism-the burden, however, still remains. In
contrast, by substituting an express rollover provision for the effective rollover
mechanism, the aggregate administrative burden for taxpayers and the government
should be reduced. And, with express rollover, taxpayers may still need professional
services in locating suitable property and advising on the tax consequences; thus, some
shifting of the administrative burden from the IRS to taxpayers may continue to occur,
but with a reduced overall burden for the taxpayers and the government. If it is viewed
as appropriate to shift a greater portion of the administrative costs associated with a like
kind rule employing express rollover to those taxpayers that use the provision, there are
more sensible alternatives than retaining the complexity of the effective rollover
mechanism solely to compel taxpayers to seek professional assistance. For example,
express rollover could be coupled with a process under which taxpayers would be
required to obtain certification from a licensed third party that there has been a timely
acquisition of like kind replacement property. Another possibility would be to impose
a user fee on taxpayers who apply the like kind rule in reporting their tax liabilities.
187. This Article's analysis of the like kind rule has focused on the rule's
application to dispositions of appreciated property. Although the like kind rule currently
results in nonrecognition of losses on like kind exchanges involving depreciated
property, it should be fairly easy for taxpayers to avoid the nonrecognition of losses by
selling the relinquished property to one party and acquiring the replacement property
from another party-that is, by avoiding an exchange. See Willis, supranote 11, at 8889. Thus, the nonrecognition of loss under current law appears to be merely a trap for
the unwary. See id. Nevertheless, in connection with adopting an express rollover rule
for like kind transactions involving appreciated property, some consideration should be
given to applying this rule to dispositions involving depreciated property as well. Cf
Thomas L. Evans, The RealizationDoctrineafter Cottage Savings, 70 TAXES 897, 90102 (1992) (recommending that the like kind rule employ a rollover provision that would
apply to both gain and loss property). Similar to an efficiency analysis of the wash sale
provision contained in Section 1091, the efficiency case for applying the like kind
rollover rule to loss property would appear to depend on whether such an approach
would deter selective realization of losses for tax purposes to a greater extent than it
encourages waiting longer to acquire like kind property. Cf Shaviro, supranote 17, at
47-48 (analyzing the efficiency case for the wash sale rule).
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C. Replacement Periods
As discussed in the previous Part, this Article recommends that the like kind
rule expressly permit taxpayers to sell property and use the proceeds to acquire
like kind property.'88 Also, for practical reasons, express rollover should
continue to be allowed under the involuntary conversion rule. 8 9 Consequently,
issues arise as to the appropriate replacement periods for like kind transactions
and involuntary conversions in light of fundamental tax policies.
Under current law, the period for replacing involuntarily converted property
is generally two years after close of the taxable year in which the conversion
occurs. 9 ' This period is extended to three years for condemnations of business

or investment real property. 191While the like kind rule currently does not allow
for express rollover treatment, the rules for deferred exchanges effectively allow
rollover treatment, with the requirement that the replacement property be (i)
identified within 45 days of the transfer of the relinquished property and (ii)
acquired within the earlier of 180 days after the transfer of the relinquished
property or the due date for filing the return (with extensions) for the year of
disposition. 92 Recently, the IRS has also permitted taxpayers to acquire the
replacement property before the disposition of the relinquished property in some
circumstances. 93
In addressing the replacement period for like kind transactions, the
methodology for reform developed earlier indicates that efficiency and tax
administration considerations shouldbe taken into account. As discussed earlier,
a rollover mechanism is consistent with the efficiency rationale for the like kind
rule to the extent that it serves as a surrogate for actual linkage between the
disposition of the relinquished property and the acquisition of the replacement
property. 94 Actual linkage can reasonably be inferred when the delay in
acquiring the replacement property is no greater than the time required to locate
and acquire the like kind property. Consequently, efficiency concerns indicate
that such a time period should be selected as the replacement period for like kind
transactions.
With regard to administrability, problems could result if the replacement
period is permitted to go beyond the date for filing the tax return for the year of

188. See supra Part V.B.
189. See supranote 165.

190. See I.R.C. § 1033(a)(2)(B)(i) (2000).
191. See id. § 1033(g)(4). In addition, the IRS may extend the replacement period
upon application by a taxpayer. See id. § 1033(a)(2)(B)(ii).
192. See id. § 1031(a)(3).
193. See Rev. Proc. 2000-37, 2000-40 I.R.B. 308.
194. See supranote 167 and accompanying text.
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the disposition. For example, in situations where a taxpayer acquires some of
the replacement property during the taxable year of the disposition, but is
permitted to acquire additional replacement property after the return due date for
that year, it would not be possible to determine the adjusted basis of the already
acquired property, as well as depreciation deductions with respect to that
property (if it is depreciable), by the return due date for that year. More
generally, if the replacement period were to extend beyond the return due date
for the year of the disposition, taxpayers would be required to file amended
returns for the year of the disposition where like kind property was not acquired
within the replacement period, thus, necessitating rules extending the statute of
limitations on assessing taxes attributable to the failure to timely replace the
For the former reason and presumably the latter as
relinquished property.'
period
limitations
applicable to deferred like kind exchanges
well, the exchange
require that the replacement property be acquired no later than the due date for
filing the return (with extensions) for the year of the disposition. 96
Taken together, these considerations call for a replacement period that
allows a taxpayer the time required to locate and acquire like kind property,
provided the period does not extend beyond the return due date for the year of
the disposition. One approach that may satisfy these conditions would be to use
a bifurcated method that is similar to the approach used currently for deferred
like kind exchanges: separate periods for identifying and acquiring the
replacement property.'97 Requiring a taxpayer to identify the replacement
property at or near the time of the disposition may be more in line with the
efficiency rationale for nonrecognition treatment; according to this policy basis
for nonrecognition, the taxpayer has, at the time of the disposition, already made
up her mind to acquire insignificantly different property. Nonetheless, there may
be many properties that fall within this "insignificantly different" class and, thus,
identifying property could take some time. Moreover, an identification
requirement with little time and freedom to decide on replacement property
could result in efficiency costs, given that taxpayers may delay disposition ofthe
relinquished property in situations where they need more time to locate
replacement property. Perhaps more importantly, administrative considerations
counsel against using a bifurcated approach. An identification requirement with
some flexibility, such as the three-property,'98 200-percent,' 99 and 95-percent"
195. Cf I.R.C. § 1033(a)(2)(C), (D)(extending the limitations period for assessing
taxes that are attributable to involuntary conversions).
196. See H.R. REP. No. 98-432, pt.2, at 1233-34 (1984); S. PRT. No. 98-169, Vol.
I, at 243-44 (April 2, 1984).
197. See supranote 192 and accompanying text.
198. Under the three-property rule, ataxpayer may identify up to three propertiei,
without regard to their fair market values. Treas. Reg. § 1.1031 (k)- I(c)(4)(i)(A) (2001).
199. Under the 200-percent rule, a taxpayer may identify any number ofproperties,
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rules used under current law, can lead to uncertainties and complications in its
application.2"' Even if a "one property" identification rule were employed,
controversies may still arise in situations where the property is subject to change
after its identification but prior to its acquisition, such as with property to be
constructed. °2
Although possibly sacrificing some theoretical accuracy, on balance the
better approach would be to have a single time period within which like kind
property must be acquired. Regarding the specific period, while the time
required to locate and acquire like kind property is somewhat uncertain, it would
seem that allowing taxpayers in the order of six months would be adequate and
not overly generous. 2 3 A six-month replacement period would also be within
the return filing deadline (including extensions) for the year of the disposition.
To allow some flexibility for situations where the replacement property needs to
be acquired before the disposition of the relinquished property, it is
recommended that taxpayers be permitted to acquire the replacement property
up to six months before the disposition of the relinquished property, similar to
the recently authorized practice of permitting reverse exchanges under the
deferred exchange rules. 2 Presumably for similar reasons, the staff ofthe Joint
Committee on Taxation, in proposing express rollover treatment for like kind
transactions, would allow taxpayers to acquire like kind property within 180

provided that the aggregate fair market value of identified properties as ofthe end of the
identification period does not exceed 200 percent of the aggregate fair market value of
the relinquished properties as of the date of the transfer to the other party. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.1031(k)-l(c)(4)(i)(B) (2001).
200. Under the 95-percent rule, any property that is timely identified and received
by the taxpayer will satisfy the identification requirement so long as the taxpayer timely
receives identified property whose fair market value is at least ninety-five percent of the
aggregate fair market value of all of the identified properties (with fair market values
determined on the earlier of the date that the property is received by the taxpayer or the
end of the exchange period). Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(k)-l(c)(4)(ii)(B) (2001).
201. For example, in applying the 200-percent and 95-percent rules, it may be
difficult to determine the fair market values of the identified properties. See Hamill,
supra note 176, at 720 (recommending that taxpayers use the seller's asking price in
planning with regard to the 200-percent rule).
202. Cf. id. at 721 (noting the special problems presented by property to be
constructed in light of the regulations' requirement that the property received be
substantially the same as the property identified).
203. This is the acquisition period under the current rules for deferred like kind
exchanges, and there is no indication from taxpayers or practitioners that this period is
inadequate.
204. See supranote 193 and accompanying text.
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days before or after the date of the relinquished property's disposition, but not
later than the return due date for the year of the disposition.0 5
Similar considerations apply in determining the appropriate replacement
period for involuntary conversions. According to the perceptional horizontal
equity basis for nonrecognition, a taxpayer who involuntarily converts property
and acquires insignificantly different property is perceived as similarly situated
to a taxpayer who continues to hold the same property. Treating an involuntary
converter like a continued holder only seems proper, however, where the period
of forced divestment does not exceed the time required to locate and acquire
eligible replacement property; otherwise, the more appropriate comparison for
an involuntary converter appears to be a taxpayer who, as a result of a forced
realization, decides to change investments (or simply remain liquid), and
subsequently acquires property that happens to be insignificantly different from
the converted property. Consequently, the horizontal equity basis indicates that
the replacement period for involuntary conversions should be the time required
to locate and acquire eligible replacement property. As with respect to like kind
transactions, tax administration concerns also suggest an additional
consideration: that the replacement period not extend beyond the due date for
filing the return for the year of the involuntary conversion.
Unlike with respect to like kind transactions, however, it may be difficult
to develop a replacement period for involuntary conversions that meets both of
these objectives. This is because a reasonable time period for locating and
acquiring eligible replacement property upon an involuntary conversion may go
beyond the return due date for the year of the conversion. Unlike the voluntary
disposition situation, a taxpayer who experiences an involuntary conversion
typically does not have a great deal of advance notice and, thus, the ability to
begin locating eligible replacement property prior to the conversion. Moreover,
a taxpayer may have difficulty in immediately beginning the task of replacing
the converted property because of the possible disruption to her personal affairs
and business activities as a result of the conversion. Presumably, these factors
account for the longer replacement period under current law for involuntary
conversions as compared to deferred like kind exchanges, as well as the fact that
the replacement period for involuntary conversions extends beyond the return
due date for the year of the conversion.
Nevertheless, there may be reasons for using a shorter replacement period
for involuntary conversions than that used under current law, possibly one that
falls within the return due date limitation. First, if, as this Article recommends,
a modified like kind standard is used to determine eligible replacement property
for involuntary conversions, a taxpayer may need less time to locate such
property. With the more liberal like kind test as compared to the similar property

205. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM.

ON TAXATION, supra note
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standard, in many cases there should be more available property that would
qualify as eligible replacement property. While business and investment
considerations are important in deciding how to replace converted property, tax
consequences also matter. Consequently, with more eligible replacement
property, a taxpayer should have an easier and quicker task of locating
qualifying property. On the other hand, condemnations of business or
investment real property, which are probably the most common type of
involuntary conversion, would be adversely affected by the changes
recommended by this Article. These conversions currently get the benefit of the
broad like kind standard for real property, and the proposal calls for
modifications that would narrow this standard. The proposal would still provide
taxpayers with a fairly liberal categorization test for real property, however, and,
thus, the task of locating and acquiring eligible replacement property may not be
significantly more difficult.
A more important reason for possibly shortening the replacement period
for involuntary conversions is the ability of the Internet and other technological
advances to facilitate the process of locating property. With the existence of
websites such as eBay, prospective purchasers can readily and speedily access
and search information regarding a wide array of properties. Specialized data
bases are also available for real estate and other specific types of property.
Retail and wholesale purchases are also facilitated by the Internet and related
technologies. Consequently, while atwo (or three) yearreplacementperiod may
have been warranted at one time, a shorter period may suffice in today's
20 6
electronic commercial environment.
Nonetheless, even if a shorter rollover period for involuntary conversions
is justified, there is some uncertainty as to whether using a return due date
limitation would allow sufficient time to locate and acquire eligible replacement
property. Perhaps a study could be performed to ascertain the percentage of
taxpayers who under current law replace involuntarily converted property by the
due date for filing returns for the year of the conversion. Under current law,
taxpayers experiencing an involuntary conversion are required to notify the IRS
on their returns 2 7 that a replacement has been made or that no replacement will
be made, in order to begin the running of the statute of limitations on
assessment; 208 in particular, where a replacement is made prior to the return due
date for the year of the conversion, taxpayers are instructed to include a
statement in their return for that year which provides details with respect to the

206. Indeed, up until 1969, Congress was of the view that a one-year replacement
period was appropriate. Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 915(a), 83 Stat. 723 (1970).
207. The IRS has also allowed the designation of replacement property on an
amended return. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 84-24-026 (March 12, 1984).
208. See I.R.C. § 1033(a)(2)(C) (2000).
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replacement. 0 9 Consequently, a study of tax return information should reveal
the portion of taxpayers replacing property by the return due date for the year of
the conversion.1 0 That a high percentage of taxpayers replace property by this
date would suggest that a replacement period with a return due date limitation
would provide adequate time to replace property; a low percentage, however,
does not necessarily indicate that such a replacement period would be
inadequate, but would merely be inconclusive on the issue, given that taxpayers
may be able to adjust to a shorter replacement period.2"

209. See IRS Publication 547, at 8-11 (2001).
210. As noted above, any changes to the applicable standard would likely affect
the time needed by taxpayers to locate eligible replacement property; therefore, it would
be advisable to conduct this study after the effective date of any modifications to the
eligible replacement property standard for involuntary conversions.
211. At least one situation involving involuntary conversions requires that there
be some flexibility in the replacement period. Taxpayers involved in condemnation
proceedings may sometimes contest the amount of the award. Yet, despite the contest
the condemnation proceeds are generally available for withdrawals, thus, triggering the
start of the replacement period. See Edwards, supranote 102, at A-37. Thus, taxpayers
who wait until the contest is resolved to replace property may find that the replacement
period has expired. It may be difficult, however, for the taxpayer to replace the
condemned property while the award is still in dispute, given that the taxpayer does not
know the extent of the required reinvestment; and a taxpayer who timely replaces the
condemned property on the basis of the initial award would not have the ability to avoid
the recognition of gain attributable to an additional award received after the expiration
of the replacement period. See, e.g., Shipes v. Commissioner, 74 T.C.M. (CCH) 2
(1997). If the period for involuntary conversions is shortened, the problem would be
even more pronounced. Current law provides a potential solution by giving the IRS
discretion to extend the replacement period for an involuntary conversion upon
application by a taxpayer. I.R.C. § 1033(a)(2)(B) (2000). Among the situations where
the IRS has granted extensions are cases involving taxpayers in disputes over
condemnation awards. See Edwards, supra note 102, at A-39. Allowing the IRS to
continue to have such discretion may result in administrative burdens forthe agency (see,
e.g., Rev. Rul. 76-488, 1976-2 C.B. 244), and the courts as well to the extent that
taxpayers litigate denials of extension applications. See, e.g., Boyce v. United States,
405 F.2d 526 (Ct. Cl. 1968). Furthermore, with the recommended generally more liberal
standard for eligible replacement property, along with the enhanced ability to locate
property electronically, there may not be the general need for discretionary extensions.
On the other hand, the disputed condemnation award situation and other cases involving
similar circumstances, such as disputes over insurance awards, do warrant a discretionary
extension procedure. Consequently, it is recommended that the IRS at least be allowed
to extend the replacement period in situations involving disputes over the amount of
condemnation or insurance proceeds.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss4/1
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D. The Holding Requirement Under the Like Kind Rule
In addition to the like kind standard and the exchange requirement, the like
kind rule contains a third basic requirement for achieving nonrecognition
treatment: a taxpayer must hold both the relinquished property and the
replacement property either for productive use in a trade or business or for
investment. 212 Current law, thus, uses an intent-based holding requiremen t ; that
is, at the time of the exchange, the taxpayer must have intended to hold the
exchanged properties for either a business or investment purpose. There are, of
course, other options. The like kind rule could require that the taxpayer hold the
relinquished and replacement properties for business use or investment for a
specified period of time.213 A third possibility would be to not have a holding
requirement; the involuntary conversion rule does not require that the properties
be held for certain uses, thus, suggesting that a holding requirement is not a sine
qua non for nonrecognition treatment. This section examines which of these
options would best promote fundamental tax policies.2" 4

212. See I.R.C. § 1031(a)(1) (2000). It is permissible for the relinquished property
to be held for investment and for the replacement property to be held for business use,
or vice versa. See Treas. Reg § 1.1031(a)-1(a)(1) (2001).
213. See H. R. 3299, 101st Cong. (1989) (bill, which was not enacted into law)
calling for several amendments to the like kind rule, including a provision requiring
taxpayers (i) to have held the relinquished property for either business use or investment
for the one-year period ending on the date of the exchange and (ii) to hold the
replacement property for either business use or investment for the one-year period
beginning on the date of the exchange); see also STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON
TAXATION; supranote 12, at 305 (recommending that the relinquished and replacement
properties be held for either business use or investment for a specified period of time,
with the period of use by the taxpayer's transferor counting toward this requirement in
certain circumstances).
214. Aside from possibly being supported by fundamental tax policies, the policy
rationale for the holding requirement is not completely clear. The legislative history to
the Internal Revenue Act of 1921, which contained the first like kind statute, does not
expressly discuss the reasons for the holding requirement. Nevertheless, the holding
requirement appears to relate to a congressional purpose of encouraging economically
desirable transactions. See Jensen, supra note 10, at 90 (speculating that this is the
reason for the holding requirement); cf. William D. Popkin, The Deep Structure of
CapitalGains, 33 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 153, 158 (1983) (concluding based on the
legislative history of the 1921 Act that this economic purpose was the reason for the
enactment of the like kind provision); Trent, supranote 57, at 367 (viewing Section 1031
as implementing a pro-investment policy). As noted earlier, I do not view targeted
measures aimed at promoting economic growth as advancing fundamental tax policies.
See supra note 17. Consequently, this section will analyze the holding requirement in
light of the efficiency norm aimed at minimizing excess burden, the fundamental policy
assumed to support the like kind rule, as well as administrability.
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Before proceeding, it would aid the analysis to divide the application of the
holding requirement into several categories of situations. The holding
requirement can prevent nonrecognition treatment under the like kind rule in two
general types of situations: (i) where property involved in the exchange is
received shortly before, or transferred shortly after, the exchange, and (ii) where
property involved in the exchange is held for personal purposes either at the time
of the exchange, or shortly before or after the exchange. The first situational
category can be further divided into three subcategories: (i) situations where
property involved in the exchange is involved in another nonrecognition
transaction prior or subsequent to the exchange, (ii) situations where property
involved in the exchange is either gifted to the taxpayer before the exchange or
gifted by the taxpayer after the exchange, and (iii) situations where property
involved in the exchange is involved in a taxable transaction prior or subsequent
to the exchange. Because the policy analysis of these situations may differ, and
because the holding requirement could be retained for some categories but for
not others, this section will analyze each of the four situational categories
separately in determining which of the holding requirement options would best
promote fundamental tax policies.
1. Prior or Subsequent Nonrecognition Transactions
Under current law, a taxpayer may not satisfy the holding requirement when
property involved in an exchange is received shortly before, or transferred
shortly after, the exchange by the taxpayer in a nonrecognition transaction. For
example, the IRS has ruled that the holding requirement is not satisfied where
a taxpayer contributes the exchanged property to a controlled corporation
immediately after the exchange."' Similarly, the IRS has ruled that the taxpayer
fails to satisfy the holding requirement where the exchanged property was
received immediately prior to the exchange as part of a tax-free liquidation of a
wholly-owned corporation. 6 On the other hand, the courts have held that a
taxpayer's immediate contribution of property received in an exchange to a
general partnership did not violate the holding requirement.217 The courts have

also permitted nonrecognition treatment under the like kind rule where taxpayers
engaged in an exchange of like kind property either shortly before or after taxfree liquidations under old Section 333.2"8 Similarly, the Tax Court has held that

215. See Rev. Rul. 75-292, 1975-2 C.B. 333.
216. See Rev. Rul. 77-337, 1977-2 C.B. 305.

217. See Magneson v. Commissioner, 753 F.2d 1490 (9th Cir. 1985), aff'g 81 T.C.
767 (1983).
218. See Bolker v. Commissioner, 760 F.2d 1039 (9th Cir. 1985), affig 81 T.C. 782
(1983) (liquidation before like kind exchange); Maloney v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 89
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss4/1
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former partners satisfied the holding requirement where they exchangedproperty
that was distributed to them by theirjust-terminatedpartnership. 2'9 The IRS has
ruled that an exchange did not violate the holding requirement where it was
followed shortly by the taxpayer's liquidation into its parent organization and the
parent's merger into another corporation.22°
The efficiency rationale for the like kind rule suggests that the provision
should not contain a holding requirement (whether intent based or specific
period based) that prohibits prior or subsequent nonrecognition transactions.
According to the efficiency rationale, a taxpayer who would be denied like kind
nonrecognition treatment if she were to couple a like kind transaction with a
corporate or partnership contribution may well forego the like kind transaction
and simply contribute the originally held property to the corporation or the
partnership; if, as it is assumed, taxing a like kind transaction would result in
efficiency costs by deterring relatively tax-elastic transactions, the same
efficiency consequences would appear to arise when the like kind transaction is
a precursor to a corporate or partnership contribution, provided that the like kind
transaction is not an essential step. Where a taxpayer cannot forgo the like kind
component because it is critical to the contemplated series of transactions, the
application of the holding requirement in this situation would apparently result
in efficiency costs by causing the taxpayer to alter her behavior in other ways in
order to avoid current taxation."2 One possibility is that the taxpayer could
forgo the desired contribution in favor of leasing the property to the particular
entity.t Alternatively, the taxpayer may simply hold onto the property for a

(1989) (liquidation after like kind exchange).
219. See Mason v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1988-273.
220. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 98-50-001 (Dec. 11, 1998).
221. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 12, at 305
(recommending the effective elimination of the holding requirement with regard to prior
or subsequent nonrecognition transactions; one reason for doing so is that taxpayers
would not have to avoid engaging in nonrecognition transactions solely to meet the
holding requirement, thus, permitting taxpayers to structure their business or investment
activities in the most efficient manner).
222. Professor Shaviro points out that a contribution to a partnership is likely to
be more tax-elastic than an outright sale because a tax on such a contribution could easily
be avoided by instead leasing the property to the partnership. See Shaviro, supranote
17, at 49. Professor Shaviro notes that a lease is quite likely to be feasible for persons
who are willing to form a partnership, given that they are willing to enter into an ongoing
contractual relationship. Id. Consequently, if a related like kind transaction and
partnership contribution were subject to tax because of the holding requirement, a
taxpayer may well lease the property to the partnership in lieu of a contribution.
Likewise, Professor Shaviro points out that taxing contributions to corporations may
encourage alternative arrangements such as leasing, although possibly not to the same
degree because of the important non-tax advantage of limited liability. Id. at 52.
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long enough period following the exchange before making the entity
contribution,'m or lease the property to the entity while waiting. Similarly, if the
holding requirement were to prevent nonrecognition treatment in these
situations, a taxpayer planning a partnership distribution to be followed by a like
kind transaction may well seek alternative arrangements, 4 such as forgoing the
like kind transaction, having the partnership enter into a like kind transaction
followed by a lease of the replacement property to the taxpayer,' or distributing
the original property to the taxpayer and waiting long enough before executing
the like kind transaction. Further, a taxpayer contemplating a like kind
transaction and a subsequent parent-subsidiary liquidation may well forgo the
liquidation if the holding requirement would cause current taxation, as such a
liquidation is for the most part a mere change in form. 6 Thus, it would appear
that for these situations only the "no holding requirement" option is consistent
with the efficiency rationale; aprohibition on prior or subsequent nonrecognition
transactions apparently produces efficiency costs by deterring (or delaying)
either the like kind transaction or the entity contribution or distribution.
In addition, tax administration considerations indicate that not applying the
holding requirement in this situation is the preferred approach. In this regard, the
worst of the options is the use of an intent-based holding requirement that can
disqualify like kind transactions that are coupled with nonrecognition
transactions. This approach, which is used under current law, necessitates a factintensive analysis of the particular circumstances surrounding the transactions,
and like other such approaches, results in uncertainty, controversy, and a lack of
predictability for taxpayers. 27 The complexity of the current law in this area is
compounded by the uncertain legal standards; the courts and the IRS have

223. Cf. Shaviro, supra note 17, at 47 (pointing out that the wash sale rule may
result in efficiency costs to the extent that taxpayers alter their transactions to avoid the

rule, by waiting more than thirty days to buy back loss stock where they otherwise would
have repurchased the stock sooner); infra notes 253-62 and accompanying text
(discussing the efficiency consequences of narrow rules with continuous frictions).
224. Cf. Lipton, supra note 178, at 81 (finding that there is no policy reason for
denying Section 1031 treatment where property distributed by apartnership is exchanged
for like kind property, given that the taxpayer's economic position has not changed).
225. Cf. Shaviro, supranote 17, at 49 (noting that if partnership distributions were

subject to tax, they may avoid the tax through alternative arrangements such as using
leases).
226. Cf. Shaviro, supra note 17, at 55 (pointing out that currently taxing the

liquidation of a controlled subsidiary would probably deter such transactions in many
cases given that they are sufficiently a mere change in form).
227. See Levine, supranote 83, at A-3, A-21 (noting that it is uncertain how long
the relinquished and replacement properties must be held by the taxpayer to satisfy the

holding requirement).
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allowed certain types of nonrecognition transactions, but not others, to be
coupled with like kind exchanges.'
Nevertheless, even with clear legal
standards, an intent test presents administrative difficulties and results in costly
tax planning. Partly for these reasons, the staff of the Joint Committee on
Taxation has recommended that the occurrence of prior or subsequent
nonrecognition transactions should not affect whether the holding requirement
is met. 9
The use ofa specific period-based holding requirement for these situations
would also result in complexity. As is the case with other specific holding
period requirements,'" this approach would appear to require rules that suspend
the holding period for any periods that a taxpayer's risk of loss with respect to
the property is substantially diminished by arrangements such as holding a put
on the exchanged property, a short sale, or other similar transactions; '
otherwise, the holding requirement would appear to lack substance andbe easily
avoidable. As a consequence, while the use of a specific holding period
requirement would avoid the uncertainty regarding how long the exchanged
properties must be held, the apparent need to have risk of loss rules introduces
intricacy, as well as uncertainty given that rules should be open-ended to a
degree. In addition, there would still be a significant amount of tax planning
with such an approach, as taxpayers will no doubt seek alternative arrangements
to avoid the recognition of gain," 2 and probably attempt to devise strategies
aimed at minimizing the risk of loss while avoiding the rules which would
suspend the holding period.
The best option administratively would be to allow like kind nonrecognition
treatment regardless of whether there is a prior or subsequent nonrecognition
transaction. This approach would avoid the uncertainty and intricacy of the other
options, as well as reduce the amount of tax planning in these situations.
Consequently, because this approach appears to be also supported by the
efficiency rationale, this Article recommends that qualification under the like
kind rule be unaffected by prior or subsequent nonrecognition transactions
involving the relinquished or replacement property.

228. See supranotes 215-20 and accompanying text.
229. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supranote 12, 305.
230. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 103 1(g) (2000) (risk of loss rules that apply in connection
with the specific holding period used under the like kind related party rule); id. §
453(e)(2) (risk of loss rules that apply in connection with the specificholding period used
under the installment method related party rule).
231. Indeed, the 1989 proposal to use a specific period-based holding requirement
under the like kind rule incorporated the risk of loss rules under the like kind related
party rule. See H.R. REP. No. 101-247, at 1342 (1989).
232. See supranotes 221-26 and accompanying text.
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2. Prior or Subsequent Gifts
Under current law, ataxpayer may not satisfy the holding requirement when
the property involved in the exchange is either gifted to the taxpayer shortly
before the exchange or gifted by the taxpayer shortly after the exchange. For
example, the Tax Court has held that an exchange did not qualify under the like
kind rule where the taxpayer gifted the replacement properties, which were two
residences, to her children seven months after the exchange, and during the
seven month period the children lived in, and made improvements to, the
residences. The court concluded that the taxpayer acquired the replacement
properties with the intention of making the gifts, thus, failing to satisfy the
holding requirement. 3
The policy analysis of the holding requirement for the gift situation is
similar to the analysis for the situation involving related nonrecognition
transactions. With regard to efficiency, a holding requirement that prohibits
prior or subsequent gifts would appear to result in efficiency costs. With such
a holding requirement, a taxpayer contemplating a like kind transaction and
subsequent gift would likely change her behavior, rather than suffer current
income taxation, by either foregoing the like kind transaction, gifting other
property instead,"' or waiting long enough before making the gift. For the
reasons expressed earlier, 5 the best option administratively is not to disqualify
a like kind transaction because of the occurrence of a prior or subsequent gift of
the relinquished or replacement property.
Consequently, this Article
recommends the use of this approach.
3. Prior or Subsequent Taxable Transactions
Under current law, a taxpayer may be denied like kind nonrecognition
treatment under the holding requirement when the property involved in the
exchange is received shortly before, or is transferred (or intended to be
transferred) shortly after, the exchange by the taxpayer in a taxable sale or
exchange; in these circumstances, the courts and the IRS may determine that the
exchanged property was not held for a business or investment purpose, but

233. Click v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 225 (1982), aff'd in an unpub. opin (4th Cir.
1982). On the other hand, the Tax Court upheld a qualifying like kind exchange when
the taxpayer gifted the replacement property to his son nine months after the exchange.
See Wagensen v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 653 (1980).
234. See Shaviro, supranote 17, at 41 (noting this planning response as one of the
reasons why a rule imposing current tax on gifts of appreciated property might be
questionable on efficiency grounds).
235. See supra notes 227-32 and accompanying text.
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instead for the purpose ofdisposing of the property. 6 Importantly, however, the
tax consequences stemming from the denial of like kind treatment in these
circumstances are generally quite minimal. This is because where a taxpayer
acquires the relinquished property in a taxable transaction shortly before the
exchange, her basis in the property would likely be approximately equal to the
fair market value of the property at the time of the exchange; consequently, there
should be little realized gain or loss on the exchange. 7 Similarly, where the
taxpayer disposes of the replacement property in a taxable transaction shortly
after the exchange, her amount realized on the transaction would likely be
approximately equal to the fair market value of the property at the time of the
exchange; therefore, any gain or loss that would not be recognized on the
exchange would likely be recognized anyway on the subsequent taxable
transaction. To be sure, denying like kind treatment in situations where a
taxpayer intends to sell the replacement property would have significant tax
consequences if the sale does not occur for a number of years. It would appear
unlikely that the courts or the IRS, however, would find such an intention in the
absence of a subsequent sale, although there are a few reported cases where this
has occurred;"s and, where an intention to sell the replacement property is found
to exist despite there being no sale by the time of the determination, it would
seem likely that a sale would occur in the near future, thus, minimizing the tax
benefits resulting from according nonrecognition treatment to the like kind
transaction. In light of the likely minimal tax consequences, it does not seem
to be worth the effort to administer a prohibition on prior or subsequent taxable
transactions. Consequently, this Article recommends that qualification under the
like kind rule be unaffected by either the occurrence of a prior purchase of the
relinquished property or subsequent sale of the replacement property, or an
intention to sell the replacement property.239

236. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 77-297, 1977-2 C.B. 304.
237. See. id.
238. See Regals Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 127 F.2d 931 (2d Cir. 1942); Black
v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 90 (1960); Land Dynamics v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. Memo
1978-259.
239. Nonetheless, the exclusion for inventory property and the like would prevent
qualification under the like kind rule for situations where the relinquished property is
held primarily for sale. See id. § 1031 (a)(2)(A) (2000). (As noted earlier, this Article is
not altering the type of property excluded from the coverage of the like kind rule. See
supra note 83 and accompanying text.) Furthermore, while the language of the Section
1031(a)(2)(A) exclusion would seem to suggest otherwise, some courts and
commentators appear to read the Section 1031 (a)(2)(A) exclusion as applying to the
replacement property as well. See Black v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 90 (1960); Land
Dynamics v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. Memo 1978-259; Woodbury v. Commissioner, 49
T.C. 180, 197 (1967); Levine, supra note 83, at A-29. Consequently, if this view is
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4. Personal Use Property
Under current law, a transaction does not qualify under the like kind rule
where the taxpayer holds either the relinquished property or the replacement
property for personal purposes. For the most part, the restriction for personal use
property affects personal residences; except for collectibles, other types of
personal use property rarely appreciate in value, and with the apparently narrow
like kind standard for collectibles,' ° the personal use restriction probably has
little effect on these items.2"' Thus, the primary effect of the holding requirement
in this situation is to deny like kind treatment where a taxpayer exchanges a
personal residence for other real estate or vise versa. Because the holding
requirement is concerned with a taxpayer's intent at the time of the exchange,
realty that is recently converted from or to personal residence status can be
disqualified as well.
Personal residences include principal residences as well as other residences,
or what may be referred to as vacation homes. With regard to principal
residences, however, the exclusion of gain under Section 121 lessens the impact
of the holding requirement. This provision allows a taxpayer to exclude
$250,000 (or $500,000, if married filing jointly) of gain from the sale of a
principal residence, provided that the taxpayer used the property as her principal
residence for two of the previous five years. 2 Consequently, assuming that the
Section 121 holding period is satisfied, a taxpayer disposing of a principal
residence would only be concerned with qualifying under the like kind rule in
situations where there is more than $250,000 (or $500,000, if the taxpayer is

followed, an intention to sell the replacement property may still disqualify the transaction
for Section 1031 treatment despite my recommendation to not apply the holding
requirement in this context.
240. Cf Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81-27-089 (Apr. 10, 1981) (dealing with artwork).
241. In any event, since the desire to dispose of a collectible is not likely to be
motivated by important personal or business objectives, the disposition of a collectible
followed by a related acquisition of a similar collectible may well be deterred in the
absence of nonrecognition treatment; consequently, the efficiency rationale for the like
kind rule would seem to support the rule's application to collectibles. As discussed
below, this may not be the case for personal residences. See infra notes 245-65 and
accompanying text.
242. I.R.C. § 121 (2000). The provision waives the two-year holding period
requirement (with a reduced gain exclusion limitation) for dispositions of principal
residences resulting from a change in the place of employment or the health of the
taxpayer. Id. § 121(c).
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married filing jointly) of realized gain on the disposition;243 I shall refer to such
situations as dispositions of a "mega" residence. 2"
The efficiency consequences of denying like kind treatment to the
disposition of a mega residence appear to be uncertain.24 On the one hand, a
taxpayer desiring to change principal residences may well be motivated by
important personal orbusiness objectives, such as the need for a larger home due
to family circumstances or the need to relocate because of a change in the place
of employment; consequently, despite the similarities of the properties involved,
such a transaction may well have substantial nontax significance and, thus, may
not be deterred by current taxation.2
As a result, applying the holding
requirement to deny like kind nonrecognition treatment in this situation may not
produce efficiency costs at Time Two. On the other hand, wealthier taxpayers
(who would typically be the type of taxpayer disposing of a mega residence)24
may base their decision to change principal residences on more discretionary
reasons, such as a change of scenery or desire to have more luxury, which may
make the disposition more tax-elastic.
Perhaps of greater significance, a wealthier taxpayer in particular (because
of greater sophistication or greater access to tax advisers), may attempt to
convert her mega residence into investment real estate by renting it out for a
sufficient period of time before the disposition.2' The former mega residence
could then be exchanged for business or investment real estate in a qualifying
like kind transaction. The taxpayer, after a sufficient period of time, may then

243. Even in these situations, taxpayers may be unconcerned with satisfying the
like kind rule unless the amount of realized gain significantly exceeds the excludable
amount under Section 121.
244. I acknowledge Professor Annette Nellen and Mr. Ron Platner for devising this
label for principal residences that exceed Section 121's dollar limitations. See Annette
Nellen and Ron Platner, Disposition of a Principal Residence after TRA '97:
Perspective,Planning,and Problems,25 J. REAL EsT. TAx'N 319 (1998).
245. The analysis in this subsection assumes that Section 121 will continue to be
a feature of the tax law.
246. See Shaviro, supranote 17, at 46.
247. In this regard, it is reported that the percentage of home sales with realized
gains exceeding $500,000 is less than one percent. See CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 71 at
341.
248. See Nellen and Platner, supra note 244, at 325-30 (discussing strategies to
convert amegaresidence to investmentproperty forpurposes ofqualifying under Section
1031; stating their belief that the bona fide rental ofamega residence for at least one year
should be sufficient to convert the residence into qualifying property for purposes of the
like kind rule); cf.Priv. Ltr. Rul. 84-29-039 (April 17, 1984) (stating that a rental period
of two years is sufficient to convert a residence to investment property for purposes of
Section 1031); Hamill, supranote 176, at 719 (pointing out that temporary rentals of at
least a year are advised to establish investment motive).
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be able to convert the replacement property into her new principal residence,
although the step transaction doctrine may prevent this strategy; 9 alternatively,
the taxpayer may be able to use borrowings or other funds to acquire her new
principal residence. A taxpayer who wants to dispose of a mega residence and
acquire a smaller principal residence may also have an avenue for achieving
current tax-free treatment. Specifically, it may be possible to first convert the
mega residence into qualifying Section 1031 property by employing a temporary
rental strategy and then exchange the property for a new principal residence and
qualifying like kind replacement property (e.g., rental real estate) in a tax-free
transaction." ° While the new principal residence would be treated as boot for
purposes of recognizing gain under the like kind rule (because it would not be
qualifying Section 1031 property), the taxpayer may be able to exclude the gain
on the mega residence under Section 121 (up to the $250,000 or $500,000
limitation)." These possibilities suggest that the denial of like kind treatment
in this situation may well result in tax-induced behavioral changes and, thus,
efficiency costs at Time Two." 2

249. See Nellen and Platner, supra note 244, at 328, 331 (noting possible
conversion of the replacement property into a principal residence and pointing out
potential step transaction doctrine obstacle).
250. Cf id. at 326-28 (suggesting similar techniques for disposing of mega
residences).
251. See id. at 326 (concluding that there appear to be no policy reasons against
the simultaneous application of Sections 1031 and 121; stating that official guidance is
needed in this area). Indeed, proposed regulations under Section 121 effectively apply
this treatment to involuntary conversions by reducing the amount realized on the
conversion by the amount of gain excluded under Section 121. See Prop. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.121-4(d), Fed. Reg. 60136, 60140 (Oct. 10, 2000). Thus, under these proposed
regulations, the cash that a taxpayer effectively squeezes out of an involuntary
conversion and subsequent replacement, which normally would bring about the
recognition of realized gain (to the extent of the cash), will not result in includable gain
to the extent of the Section 121 exclusion.
252. Where a taxpayer's primary goal is not to change principal residences, but
instead to shift the amounts invested in a mega residence to an investment in income
producing real estate, the Time Two costs resulting from the application of the holding
requirement appear to be greater. Because a disposition of the mega residence in this
situation would not be motivated by important personal or business reasons, the
disposition would more likely be deterred (as compared to the change of principal
residence situation) in the absence of like kind nonrecognition treatment. Furthermore,
in this situation the taxpayer would only have to convert the relinquished property into
investment realty in order to achieve both her nontax objective as well as qualifying for
like kind treatment, thus, suggesting an even greater possibility that the taxpayer would
employ a temporary rental strategy.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss4/1
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The application of the holding requirement to mega residences and the
ability of taxpayers to satisfy it by employing temporary rental strategies is an
example of what Professor Schizer describes as a narrow rule with a continuous
friction. 3 According to Schizer, a friction is a constraint on tax planning that
is external to the tax law. 4 As he points out, a narrow rule that prevents a tax
benefit is less likely to be effective where frictions are continuous, that is, where
a taxpayer can wait a little longer or take on a little more risk in order to obtain
the desired tax treatment.s 5 The use of a narrow rule in these situations may
result in socially wasteful tax-motivated transactions while not preventing
taxpayers from qualifying for the sought after tax benefit. 6 Consistent with
Professor Schizer's analysis, the application of the holding requirement to
dispositions of mega residences may well result in temporary rentals involving
the residences followed by like kind transactions, as opposed to taxable
dispositions of the mega residences, thus, possibly producing inefficient, taxmotivated transactions.
Where there are continuous frictions, doing nothing may be better than
having an ineffective narrow rule. 217 There is, however, another option: a
broader response, if feasible, may be appropriate to limit the availability of the
tax benefit at issue. 5 Specifically, to curb tax-motivated rentals of mega
residences, the like kind rule could provide that a taxpayer would need to use a
former residence for at least several years (e.g., five years) in an income
producing activity in order for the property to qualify for nonrecognition
treatment under Section 1031. While a taxpayer can always rent out the former
residence a little longer, the cumulative effect of this continuous friction may
deter most taxpayers from employing temporary rental strategies to satisfy the
like kind rule. 59 Nonetheless, such a lengthy, specific period holding
requirement may still result in efficiency costs at Time Two. As mentioned
earlier, because the disposition of a mega residence may be discretionary, rather

253. See David M. Schizer, Frictions as a Constraint on Tax Planning, 101
COLUM. L. REv. 1312, 1327-28 (2001).
254. See id. at 1315 (stating that the term is being borrowed from the economics
literature).
255. See id. at 1326-27. In contrast, a narrow rule can be effective where frictions
are discontinuous; that is, end runs around a rule are unlikely where the taxpayer would
experience a large and unavoidable utility cost that exceeds the tax benefit involved. See
id. at 1325.
256. See id. at 1320.
257. See id. at 1320-21.
258. See id. at 1321, 1326.
259. Cf id. at 1326 (pointing out that in order for the cumulative effect of a
continuous friction to serve as an adequate deterrent, arule preventing atax benefit must
be broader).
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than compelled by a taxpayer's circumstances, the prospect of current taxation
may well cause the taxpayer to forgo changing residences. 2' Furthermore, even
with a lengthy holding requirement, some taxpayers would still engage in
temporary rentals to satisfy the requirement; and for these taxpayers, the
efficiency costs would be larger (vis-A-vis a shorter holding requirement), given
that there would be a greater amount of tax-induced behavior (i.e., longer
temporary rentals).26 ' Probably of more significance, a lengthy holding
requirement may result in the denial of like kind treatment in many situations
where the conversion of the former residence to an income producing use was
not a part of a plan to ultimately engage in a like kind transaction.262 Where a
taxpayer's decision to dispose of a former residence and acquire like kind
replacement property occurs after the property has been converted to rental
property, the intended disposition would appear to be relatively tax-elastic;
unlike the disposition of a principal residence, important personal or business
reasons would likely not be a factor in the decision to dispose of property that,
at the time of the decision, is already being used in an income-producing
capacity. Consequently, with a lengthy holding requirement, taxpayers in these
situations may well either forgo the disposition or continue to rent out the
property in order to satisfy the holding requirement, thus, resulting in possible
Time Two efficiency costs for these taxpayers.
In addition, the denial of like kind treatrent on the disposition of a mega
residence may result in Time Two efficiency costs by making it more likely that
taxpayers may engage in a tax-induced sale of their principal residence. That is,
with the dollar limitations on the excludable gain under Section 121, taxpayers
have an incentive to dispose of their principal residences when the amount of
unrealized gain on the residence reaches $250,000 (or $500,000, if the taxpayer

260. See supra note 247 and accompanying text.
261. See David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing,Doctrine,andEfficiency in the Tax
Law, 84 CORNELL L. REv. 1627, 1669-70 (1999) (pointing out that rules that reduce the
number of taxpayers who engage in tax-induced behavior may actually result in an
increase in overall efficiency costs because of greater efficiency costs for those taxpayers
who continue to alter their behavior). Of course, it would be possible to completely
eliminate temporary rental strategies by crafting a rule providing that a former residence
is ineligible for like kind nonrecognition treatment. Such an approach, however, would
significantly increase the number of situations where like kind nonrecognition treatment
would be denied even though the decision to dispose ofthe former residence and acquire
like kind replacement property occurred after the conversion to rental property-thus,
deprivingmany relatively tax-elastic transactions of nonrecognition treatment. See infra
note 262 and accompanying text.
262. Cf. Schizer, supra note 251, at 1321 (pointing out that a downside to using
broad rules is that they burden good transactions as well as bad).
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is married filingjointly). 263 With the availability of like kind treatment for mega
residences, taxpayers may be less likely to dispose of their residences when the
dollar limitation is reached, given that there would be another avenue for
achieving current tax-free treatment upon the disposition of their residences.
Balanced against the potential Time Two efficiency costs produced by the
holding requirement are possible efficiency benefits. That is, applying the
holding requirement to the disposition ofamegaresidence and, thus, disallowing
nonrecognition treatment may result in Time One benefits by increasing the
expected tax on such property. There may be Time Two benefits as well, in that
with no opportunity for nonrecognition treatment on the disposition of a mega
residence, taxpayers will not have a tax incentive to acquire real property as
replacement property as opposed to other investment or business assets. 2" Of
course, this Article assumes that taxing transactions that result in an insignificant
change in a taxpayer's position produces Time Two efficiency costs that exceed
the Time One and Time Two efficiency benefits; 265 however, the efficiency costs
resulting from disallowing nonrecognition treatment on the disposition ofa mega
residence, even if present, may not be significant enough to outweigh the
resulting efficiency benefits, given the important personal and business reasons
for going forward with the sale (and forgoing atemporary rental strategy) despite
current taxation. Consequently, the efficiency effects of denying like kind
nonrecognition treatment to the disposition of a mega residence appear to be
quite uncertain.
For other situations involving residences, a stronger case can be made that
denying like kind nonrecognition treatment produces efficiency costs. These
situations include vacation homes for other vacation homes, vacation homes for
business or investment realty, business or investment realty for vacation homes,
and business or investment realty for principal residences. Given that these
transactions are not as likely to be motivated by important personal or business
reasons, as compared to the dispositions of principal residences, they would
appear to be more tax-elastic than the dispositions of mega residences.
Consequently, the application ofthe holding requirement in these situations may
well deter'the dispositions, thus, resulting in efficiency costs at Time Two.
Alternatively, as with the situations involving mega residences, a taxpayer may
attempt to qualify the relinquished property or the replacement property for
Section 1031 treatment by employing a temporary rental strategy.

263. See Nellen and Platner, supra note 244, at 332-33.
264. Cf.H.R. REP. No. 105-148, at 347, 1997-4 C.B. 669 (noting as a reason for
the repeal of Section 1034's rollover treatment on the sale of a principal residence the
fact that the provision encouraged some taxpayers to purchase larger and more expensive
homes than they otherwise would in order to avoid a current tax liability).
265. See supranotes 78-79 and accompanying text.
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With limited guidance provided by efficiency analysis, tax administration
concerns should determine which holding requirement option to use for this
situational category. As with respect to the other categories, not applying the
holding requirement to this situation has administrative advantages over the
alternative approaches for implementing a holding requirement. 2" Additionally,
not applying the holding requirement in this situational category would avoid the
current administrative difficulties of applying the like kind rule to the disposition
ofproperties with both personal and business/investment uses.267 Consequently,
this Article suggests that qualification under the like kind rule be determined
without regard to whether the relinquished or replacement property is held for
personal purposes.268 In light of the recommendations for the other situational
categories, this would result in the complete elimination of the holding
requirement.
E. ControllingStock Interests As Eligible Replacement Property
Under current law, a taxpayer can achieve nonrecognition treatment on an

involuntary conversion by purchasing a controlling stock interest in a
corporation holding eligible replacement property, in addition to a direct
acquisition of such property.269 For like kind exchanges, however, only direct
acquisitions of eligible replacement property are permitted.270 Issues are,
therefore, raised as to whether fundamental tax policies support allowing indirect

266. See supranotes 227-32 and accompanying text.
267. See Kneave Riggal, Dual Use ofPropertyDoes Not BarNonrecognition, 54
TAX'N FORACCT. 196, 196-99 (1995) (revealing complications of applying Section 1031
to dual use property).

268. Despite this suggested change, it is worth considering an alternative that
would modify the holding requirement as it applies to personal use assets: eliminate the
holding requirement generally, but deny like kind nonrecognition treatment in situations
where the Section 121 exclusion applies to the disposition of the relinquished property,
that is, where the taxpayer owned and used the relinquished property as her principal
residence for two of the previous five years. This approach would deny like kind
nonrecognition treatment in the circumstance involving personal use property where the
efficiency case for nonrecogntion treatment appears to be the weakest; and, because such
a principal residence determination needs to be made in any event for purposes of the
Section 121 exclusion, the administrative costs of this approach may not be significant,
even though they would likely exceed the administrative costs associated with the no
holding requirement option for the personal use situation. Moreover, vertical equity
notions may provide additional support for denying like kind nonrecognition treatment
to dispositions of mega residences.
269. See I.R.C. § 1033(a)(2) (2000).

270. See id. § 1031 (a).
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acquisitions of eligible replacement property for purposes of the like kind and
involuntary conversion rules.
Allowing controlling stock interests to satisfy the replacement requirement
for involuntary conversions appears to be supported by considerations of
horizontal equity and substance over form. A taxpayer holding property could
contribute it to a corporation in exchange for a controlling stock interest and
achieve nonrecognition treatment.27' Given this, the perceptional horizontal
equity basis for the involuntary conversion rule suggests that nonrecognition
treatment should likewise be accorded a taxpayer who involuntarily disposes of
property, acquires insignificantly different property, and then contributes the
second property to a corporation for a controlling stock interest, and the
authorities have so held. 72 Substance over form considerations appear to
suggest that the tax consequences should not be any different if the involuntary
converter instead acquired a controlling stock interest in a corporation holding
the eligible replacement property; in both cases the net result is the same, given
that the taxpayer is left holding a controlling stock interest in a corporation that
holds eligible replacement property. Similar considerations apply in the context
of like kind transactions. With the recommended elimination of the holding
requirement, 273 a taxpayer would be permitted under the like kind rule to dispose
of property, acquire like kind replacement property, and then contribute the
replacement property to a corporation in exchange for a controlling stock
interest. Again, substance over form considerations appear to suggest that the
same tax treatment should apply to the acquisition of a controlling stock interest
in a corporation holding the like kind replacement property.
Furthermore, for both like kind transactions and involuntary conversions,
a plausible case can be made for extending the indirect replacement rule to
include interests in partnerships holding eligible replacement property. Under
both the current law and the recommendations made in this Article, taxpayers
involved in like kind transactions and involuntary conversions may contribute
eligible replacement property to partnerships without losing nonrecognition
treatment on the dispositions. 4 Consequently, substance over form notions
appear to also provide a basis for treating the acquisition of an interest in a
partnership that holds eligible replacement property as allowing for
27 5
nonrecognition treatment.

271. See id. § 351(a).
272. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 84-29, 1984-1 C.B. 181.
273. See supra Part V.D.
274. See supra Part V.D. (discussion of the like kind rule); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-20013 (May 18,1990) (involuntary conversion rule, where contributor's thirty-ninepercent
equity interest in the partnership was determined to be adequate control so as to qualify
under Section 1033).
275. In light of the current statutory language, however, the IRS and the courts
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An examination of efficiency considerations, however, suggests that the
substance over form basis for allowing indirect acquisitions may be weaker than
it first appears. At its core, allowing substance to dictate over form appears to
be founded on notions of efficiency. Where the form rather than the substance
of a transaction controls for tax purposes, taxpayers may be induced by the tax
consequences to follow a certain path to a desired end, even when that path may
26
result in additional transaction costs or other nontax disadvantages.
Nevertheless, while subjecting different routes to disparate tax treatment affects
taxpayer behavior, this effect may be relatively insignificant when compared to
other behavioral effects caused by the tax system, such as holding onto an asset
that, tax aside, the taxpayer desires to sell, or investing in an asset, that tax aside,
the taxpayer would not acquire; as long as at least one tax-free route remains
open, a taxpayer should still generally be able to achieve her desired end. Thus,
even though a rule preventing indirect acquisitions of replacement property may
cause taxpayers to incur additional ancillary costs, they should generally be able
to achieve their main objective by directly acquiring the replacement property
and contributing it to a corporation or partnership.277

have generally not allowed for nonrecognition treatment in these circumstances under
either the like kind rule or the involuntary conversion rule. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 57-154,
1957-1 C.B. 262.
276. Professor Shaviro points out that the existence of alternative routes with
different tax consequences for moving from one position to another can create high tax
elasticity. See Shaviro, supra note 17, at 35.
277. In addition, the controlling stock interest rule, as it currently exists under the
involuntary conversion rule, contains limitations that may curtail its usefulness as an
alternative to a direct acquisition ofreplacement property followed by a contribution to
a corporation. First, in order to prevent taxpayers from achieving nonrecognition
treatment when they have effectively re-invested only a small portion of the conversion
proceeds in eligible replacement property, the courts and IRS require that the acquired
corporation's assets consist principally of eligible replacement property. See infra note
278 and accompanying text. No such requirement applies to a direct acquisition followed
by contribution to a corporation. Second, while it appears that an indirect acquisition of
eligible replacement property is permitted only where the taxpayer acquires sole control
of the corporation holding the replacement property (see Rev. Rul. 57-454, 1957-2 C.B.
526), a taxpayer using the direct acquisition followed by contribution route may be able
to achieve nonrecognition treatment by acquiring control of the corporation either alone
or together with other contributors who are a part of the same transaction. Control by a
group of transferors can satisfy the control requirement under Section 351 for receiving
nonrecognition treatment on the transfer to the corporation. I.R.C. § 351(a) (2000).
Consequently, unless the direct replacement and corporate contribution are treated as a
replacement by stock acquisition for purposes of Section 1033(a)(2)(A)'s control
requirement under a step transaction analysis, a more liberal control requirement would
apply to the direct acquisition/corporate contribution scenario. It should be noted,
however, that in Rev. Rul. 84-29, 1984-1 C.B. 181 the IRS pointed out that the taxpayer
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss4/1
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Balanced against the possibly insignificant efficiency gains that result from
permitting indirect acquisitions of replacement property are the administrative
costs required to implement such a rule. There are two major sources of
administrative complexity associated with arulepermitting indirect acquisitions
ofreplacement property. First, under the involuntary conversion rule, the courts
and the IRS have required that the acquired corporation's assets consist
principally of eligible replacement property.278 This requirement is necessary in
order to prevent taxpayers from effectively re-investing only a small portion of
the proceeds from the disposition in eligible replacement property. Like other
similarly worded requirements under the tax law, this test lacks mathematical
certainty, and also raises issues regarding asset valuations; consequently, this
"principal" requirement has the potential for creating uncertainty as well as
controversy between taxpayers and the IRS. In addition, the controlling stock
interest rule applicable to involuntary conversions is accompanied by complex,
special rules that adjust the acquired corporation's basis in its property.279 The
rules requiring that a corporation adjust its internal basis are in addition to the
standard basis rule that preserves in the replacement property, in this case the
stock, the realized gain that went unrecognized on the involuntary conversion. 2 0
The purpose of the internal basis rules is to prevent the taxpayer from having
more aggregate depreciable basis (through the corporation) after the acquisition
of replacement property than before the involuntary conversion."' While the
internal basis rules are aimed at reducing, by the amount of the deferred gain, the
corporation's basis in the eligible replacement property, the basis of other
property (first, depreciable property other than eligible replacement property,
then any other property) may need to be reduced where the amount of the
deferred gain exceeds the corporation's original adjusted basis in the eligible
replacement property. 2 2 Moreover, where the corporation holds more than one
property that is eligible replacement property, the basis reduction needs to be
allocated among these properties in proportion to their adjusted bases. With the
recommended application of the generally more liberal like kind standard for

maintained control of the replacement assets after the transfer to the subsidiary
corporation; this may suggest that the IRS views a direct replacement followed by a
related corporate contribution as an effective stock acquisition replacement which is
subject to Section 1033(a)(2)(A)'s control requirement.
278. See Templeton v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 509, 514 (1976), supplemented by
67 T.C. 518, 518 (1976), aff'dper curiam, 573 F.2d 866 (4th Cir. 1978).
279. See I.R.C. § 1033(b)(3) (2000).
280. See id. § 1033(b)(2).
281. See H.R. REP. No. 104-737, at 309 (1996), 1996-3 C.B. 1049-50.
282. See I.R.C. § 1033(b) (2000). This is subject to another limitation which
prevents the aggregate adjusted basis in the corporation's assets from being reduced
below the amount of the taxpayer's basis in the acquired stock.
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both like kind transactions and involuntary conversions, a corporation may
commonly hold more than one property that is eligible replacement property
with respect to the property disposed of, thus, necessitating internal basis
adjustments to multiple properties. The intricate mechanics ofthis provision are
compounded by the depreciation consequences of the basis adjustments. If the
indirect acquisition rule is extended to partnership interests, the complexities
may be substantially greater, given the need to coordinate the internal basis rules
with other special basis adjustments either required or available under
Subchapter K.2"3 All of this no doubt causes increased compliance and tax
planning efforts, with their attendant costs.
Based on the preceding analysis, two observations can be made regarding
indirect acquisitions of replacement property. First, given the considerations for
and against such treatment, it seems reasonably clear that the same approach
should apply for both like kind transactions and involuntary conversions; the
efficiency benefits/administrative costs tradeoff is as applicable to voluntary
dispositions as it is to involuntary ones. 4 Less clear, however, is whether or not
to permit indirect acquisitions of replacement property. While adhering to
substance over form principles in this context is likely to produce some
efficiency benefits, these benefits may not justify the administrative costs
involved in permitting indirect acquisitions of replacement property.2 5

283. See, e.g., id. § 754.
284. The indirect replacement rule for involuntary conversions was contained in
the original version of the involuntary conversion provision enacted in the Revenue Act
of 1921, which also included the original version of the like kind rule. Revenue Act of
1921, ch. 136, §§ 202(c)(1), 214(a)(12), 234(a)(14), 42 Stat. 227. The legislative history
to the Revenue Act of 1921 provides no indication why indirect replacements were
permitted for involuntary conversions but not for like kind exchanges. See H.R. REP. NO.
350, 67-350, pt.1, at 8-10 (1921), reprintedin 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2) 175-77; S. REP. No.
67-275, pt. 1, at 11-12 (1921), reprintedin 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2) 188-89, 191; H.R. CONF.
No. 67-486, at 5 (1921), reprintedin 1939-1 C.B. (pt.2) 215. A possiblejustification for
this difference may be the need for greater flexibility in the acquisition form of
replacements for involuntary conversions in light of the generally stricter standard with
regard to eligible replacement property. Some support for this view can be found in
Section 1033(g), which allows the use of the broad like kind test for condemnations of
business or investment real property but does not permit indirect replacements to satisfy
this standard. In any event, applying the same eligible replacement property standard for
involuntary conversions and like kind transactions, as this Article recommends, would
remove such a justification for treating these dispositions differently with respect to
indirect replacements.
285. Of course, taxpayers wanting to avoid the internal basis complexities can
always do so by engaging in direct acquisitions ofreplacement property. Thus, it can be
argued that where taxpayers decide to acquire replacement property indirectly, the
efficiency benefits resulting from taxpayers being able to employ their preferred
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F. Generally Conforming the Like Kind andInvoluntary Conversion
Rules Should Result in Additional Administrative Benefits
The changes proposed by this Article would generally conform the rules
applying to like kind transactions and involuntary conversions. This should
produce additional administrative benefits by reducing the need to determine
whether certain voluntary transactions constitute involuntary conversions. This
section examines these aspects.
The primary goal of this Article is to suggest reforms with regard to the like
kind and involuntary conversion rules in light of fundamental tax policies.
Except with regard to the standard for determining eligible replacement prop erty,
this effort does not involve an explicit attempt to conform the two provisions.
Nonetheless, a by-product of the recommendations made by this Article is the
general conformance of the rules for like kind transactions and involuntary
conversions. That is, with the suggested changes the two provisions would each
contain the following features: the use of a modified like kind standard to
determine eligible replacement property, the use of an express rollover
mechanism, no requirement that the relinquished and replacement properties be
held for business or investment purposes,n 6 and either permitting or not
permitting the indirect acquisition ofreplacement property. In addition, with the
suggestion to possibly shorten the replacement period for involuntary
conversions, the replacement periods under the two provisions may be very
similar. To be sure, some differences would remain, such as types of property
excluded from coverage,287 the special rules for related party transactions,2 88 and
rules dealing with special situations under the involuntary conversion
provision.2 9 Yet, overall the two provisions would be very similar.
The general conformance of the rules for like kind transactions and
involuntary conversions should result in additional administrative benefits by
substantially reducing the need to distinguish between these two types of

acquisition form must outweigh the administrative costs involved. When one considers
the government's costs in administering the internal basis rules, however, as well as in
administering the principal corporate asset requirement, this may not be the case at all.
286. However, there would be a difference in this regard if like kind
nonrecognition treatment is denied in situations where the Section 121 exclusion applies
to the disposition of the relinquished property, an alternative approach that is worth
considering. See supranote 268.
287. As noted earlier, Section 1031 (a)(2) excludes inventory, financial assets, and
the like from the application of the like kind rule. See supranote 4 and accompanying
text. The involuntary conversion rule does not exclude any type of property from its
coverage.
288. See I.R.C. §§ 1031(f), 1033(i) (2000).
289. See, e.g., id. § 1033(h) (dealing with presidentially declared disasters).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002

67

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 4 [2002], Art. 1
MISSOURI LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 67

transactions. Under current law, disputes sometimes arise where taxpayers
engage in voluntary transactions that arguably constitute involuntary
conversions. One such situation is where a taxpayer voluntarily disposes of
property that has been damaged. In cases of this type, the authorities seek to
determine whether the disposition was essentially beyond a taxpayer's control,
or whether the damaged property could have been repaired and, thus, the
taxpayer's disposition was due to her preference for the selling the property
rather than keeping it. The former situation would constitute an involuntary
conversion, while the latter situation would not.29 The highly factual nature of
this inquiry breeds uncertainty as well as controversy. Another situation is
where a taxpayer voluntarily disposes of property that bears a functional
relationship to other property that has been condemned. Here, the courts and the
IRS have allowed involuntary conversion treatment for the voluntary disposition
if the two properties were part of an "economic unit"29 or "integrally related,"292
fact-intensive standards that can present administrative difficulties. Problems
can also arise where a taxpayer voluntarily disposes of property after receiving
some indications that the property will be condemned. The issue in these cases
is whether the circumstances amount to a threat of condemnation, a type of
involuntary conversion."' The use of substantially similar rules for like kind
transactions and involuntary conversions should alleviate most of the
controversies in these situations. This is because whether or not the situation is
determined to be an involuntary conversion, the same basic requirements would
apply for purposes of granting nonrecognition treatment to the disposition of
property.

294

290. See, e.g., C.G. Willis, Inc. v. Commissioner, 41 T.C. 468, 476 (1964), aff'd
per curiam, 342 F.2d 996 (3d Cir. 1965); Rev. Rul. 78-377, 1978-2 C.B. 208 (1978);
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-43-056 (Oct. 25, 1991); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 89-28-001 (July 14, 1989).

291. See Masser v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 741,747 (1958), acq., 1959-2 C.B. 3.
292. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 82-08-205 (Nov. 30, 1981).
293. See, e.g., Balistrieri v. Commissioner, 38 T.C.M. 526 (1979); see Robert
Kaplow, Courts' Expansion of Threats of CondemnationOpens Door Wider to Section

1033 Benefits, 51 J. TAX'N 368, 371 (1979) (discussing the pivotal factual issue of
whether it was reasonable for the taxpayer to infer that the property would have been
condemned if the property had not been sold to the private party).
294. If differences remain in the length of the replacement periods under the like
kind and involuntary conversion rules, however, this would be a potential source of
controversy in the situations described above, for example, where the replacement
occurred within the involuntary conversion period but outside of the like kind period.
This might be an additional consideration in deciding on the appropriate length of the
replacement periods for involuntary conversions. Likewise, the additional administrative
benefits of conforming the rules may also be taken into account in considering an
alternative approach for the personal use situation that would deny like kind
nonrecognition treatment in situations where the Section 121 exclusion applies to tle
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VI. CONCLUSION
The goal of this Article is to analyze and reform the like kind and
involuntary conversion rules in light of fundamental tax policies. This Article
assumes that the like kind and the involuntary conversion rules are justified by
efficiency and perceptional horizontal equity concerns, respectively, and
suggests changes to their particular features that are likely to promote these
policies as well as administrability. For certain features of the rules, I find that
the efficiency and equity underpinnings of the provisions provide limited
guidance, and I therefore propose changes aimed at simplifying the
administration of the provisions. Overall, the Article's stated assumptions and
analysis lead to the following recommended changes:
(i) the use of the like kind standard to determine eligible replacement
property under both the like kind and involuntary conversion rules, along with
narrowing the like kind standard for real property by employing a categorization
approach modeled on the real property classifications used for depreciation
purposes,
(ii) the use of an express rollover mechanism under the like kind rule,
(iii) the use of a single, rather than bifurcated, period for replacing assets
under the like kind rule, and possibly shortening the replacement period under
the involuntary conversion rule,
(iv) the elimination of the requirement under the like kind rule that the
relinquished and replacement properties be held either for a business or
investment purpose,295 and
(v) either permitting or not permitting the indirect acquisition of
replacement property under both the like kind and involuntary conversion rules.
The product of this effort is a simpler, more rational and more unified
approach for granting nonrecognition treatment to voluntary and involuntary
dispositions of property.

disposition of the relinquished property.
295. As noted earlier, it is worth considering an alternative approach that would
eliminate the holding requirement generally, but deny like kind nonrecognition treatment
in situations where the Section 121 exclusion applies to the disposition of the
relinquished property. See supra note 268.
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